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ABSTRACT
In recent years, pressure has been brought to bear in many areas of
the Department of Defense to decrease costs and at the same time, maintain
or increase efficiency.
The major organizations of the San Francisco Bay Area Supply Support
Pattern comprised one segment of the United States Navy supply system
that was compelled to revamp it's method of operation for these reasons.
An historical review was conducted which included perusal of
literature on the subjects of centralization and decentralization; and
the profusion of directives; letters, both official and personal; and
memoranda made available during a number of visits to the Mare Island
and the San Francisco Naval Shipyards. This review will bring the
reader to the present status of the Bay Area Supply Support Pattern.
The author became interested in the grov.dng pains of the Pattern
during a tour of duty at the San Francisco Naval Shipyard. With the kind
assistance provided by the Supply Officers of the activities involved as
v,
rell as personnel of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, problem areas
will be delineated and an attempt will be made to foresee the future
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Throughout the history of the United States, business has, from
it's meager beginnings, maintained steady growth to it's present behemoth
proportions. Indeed, the very size and the area serviced by the many
individual businesses has necessitated physical separation of their
management, production and product distribution functions to the far
corners of the United States and the world. This separation of functions
has been labeled Decentralization. Strangely enough, this gradual
encroachment of Decentralization on big business, as it's market situation
expanded, has been the modus operandi of the military practically since
it ' s inception.
Defense too, is big business in the United States. In order to
attain and maintain our national objectives and do this within the limits
of national resources made available to the Defense Establishment, every-
one from private citizen to the President of the United States is and should
be concerned. To make the best use of our limited resources requires not
only good planning, but careful execution, control and review of those
plans.
A primary goal of American business is to maximize profits. Because
there is no profit motive in the Government, the primary goal of the
Defense Department is to get the most security that can be obtained with
the United resources provided, [.l] To partially aid in accomplishing this
goal, various auditing and regulatory segments of the United States Navy
and the General Accounting Office determined that something could and
should be done to the San Francisco Bay Area Supply Support Pattern to
improve efficiency, economy and yet maintain the same supply support in

that area. Contrary to the decentralization concept becoming more
prevalent in private business and already existing in the military, the
action which evolved from the regulatory agency's decisions, envisioned
a Centralization or Condolidation of Supply Support in the San Francisco
Bay Area.
It is assured that the centralization concept as it is to be
presented in Chapter II was a sound one. To the extent that it is
possible and despite the many changes that have been pressed upon the
Navy Supply System during the centralization application, some semblance
of -what occurred, what it's effect was and is, and what lies ahead for
Bay Area Supply Support is the raison d'etre of this paper.
In summary, while decentralization appears to be status quo in big
business today, the defense department has felt it necessary to centralize
some of it's operations to effect necessary economies and efficiencies.
The history of these measures, as applied to the San Francisco Bay Area
Supply Support Pattern will be the subject of Chapter II, while the
recognizable results and possible future status of those results will be
the subject of Chapter III of this research paper.
II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
Partly through economy measures in printing and partly through the
great use of abbreviations in military parlance, abbreviations will be
used throughout this paper. To aid' the future reader, an explanation of
the abbreviations used are herein provided.
Centralization or Consolidation . These words are defined as the
uniting or drawing to a central point of a function or functions.
Decentralization. This word is to be considered as the converse of

centralization, that is, the dispersion or distribution of functions from
a central authority or point.
B.A.S.S. or BASS . An abbreviated term, which will be often-used.
It means Bay Area Supply Support and should be interpreted as pertaining
to the supply support pattern involving the two naval shipyards and the
Naval Supply Center in the San Francisco Bay Area.
D.M.I, or DM . Direct Material Inventory. Material that is brought
into a shipyard in advance of the arrival of and for the exclusive use
in the overhaul of a particular ship.
Shop Stores . Actual stores of material, placed in shipyard industrial
areas for the convenience of workers and for the saving of time in the
obtaining of materials.
Satellite Activities . Activities physically located within the
confines or supported by a shipyard, but not engaged in the shipyard
support effort. An example: The Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory
at the San Francisco Naval Shipyard.
Fund Split . Funds applied to the operation of a naval shipyard
supply department, and received in predetermined proportions from the
Bureau of Ships and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.
Cognizance Symbols . Symbols assigned to various categories of Navy
material as illustrated below.
"F". Major electronic equipment (radars, communication gear, etc.)
"G" . General Stores Material (Paints, Hand Tools, Cleaning gear, etc.)
"H". Machinery Repair Parts.
Edwin R. A. Seligman and others. Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences
(Vol. V-VI, DAN-GOS. New York: The MacMilian Company, 19kk) , U3-

"J". Major Ordnance Equipment (Guns, Fire Control Gear, etc.)
"N" . Electronic Equipment Repair Parts.
"P" . Submarine Equipment Repair Parts.
"S" . Major Shipboard Machinery, Equipments and Components (Pumps,
boilers, coolers, condensers, etc.)
Other abbreviations, briefly used, will be explained in the test.

CHAPTER II
THE HISTORY OF THE BAY AREA SUPPLY SUPPORT PATTERN
He that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils.
Francis Bacon
This chapter is a presentation of the literature as it applies to
supply support functions, centralization and decentralization concepts,
and in the main, to the history of the evolution of the Bay Area Supply
Support Pattern.
Every naval operation, no matter how large or small, depends on an
uninterrupted flow of supplies. Q2j In order to accomplish this uninter-
rupted flow, Admiral Dyer felt there were three fundamental requirements
of the support problem:
1. Determination of requirements.
2. Procurement of requirements.
3. Distribution of procured material.
2
and one additional requirement in peacetime, economy throughout. The
procurement and distribution of requirements had, since World "War II,
involved a supply system which in many ways had not changed. The s&me
support activities in many areas, were still performing the s.
procurement, receipt, storage, expenditure, distribution and disposal
functions in the same way. These tasks, in and. of themselves are
important and required.. However, as the time since World War II has
elapsed, the U. S. Navy, like the other military services, has become
increasingly sophisticated in it's weaponry, weapon platforms, and. the
"Vice Admiral George C. Dyer. Naval Logistics (Annapolis: United
States Naval Institute, I960), l£.

means to move and control both of them. This sophistication has cost a
great deal of money which represents a sizeable portion of our national
resources. To illustrate, it is interesting to note the phenomenal
amount of money spent on national security today in the period of the
so-called Cold War as compared with pre-World-War II standards:
1939 - $1,368,000,000.00
196U - $U9, 7U9,000, 000. 003
Despite this tremendous increase in funds, the Department of Defense does
not receive all the funds it deems necessary. For this reason funds must
be judiciously allocated v/here needed and continuous effort must be
expended to determine where additional savings may be made.
Thus it may be said that what is t ruly needed is a support system
that functions well, but due to higher priority needs, the supply system
must be made to do it's job as economically as possible.
Proposals for improvement in the process must therefore consist
largely of suggestions for procedural and structural changes. Although
he was writing about the national budget, Smithies could very easily have
been -writing about the improvements that were, in 1950, being proposed for
the San Francisco Bay Area Supply Support pattern. These improvements, as
proposed, were concerned with a departure from decentralized support to a
situation where operations were largely centralized, while coordination
and control remained decentralized. A situation not unlike that which
existed in the Kendall Company in 1952.
-^The World Almanac and Book of Facts for 1965. (New York: New
York Y/orld Telegram and Sun, 1965), 738.
A. Smithies. The Budgetary Process in the United States (Now
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Incorporated., 1955), 28.
f
J. A. Litterer. Organizations: Structure and Behavior (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Incorporated., I963), 8U.

Sone of the usual hazards of decentralization were not present
however:
1. Essentially all activities followed the policies that emanated
from Washington.
2. Members of management generally had the same goals.
3. There was an absence of conflict between the interests of the
divisions.
However, some hazards of decentralization existed:
1. Washington levels made policy decisions without consultation
with lower level management. This matter will be considered further in
Charter III.
2. Very little p< rsonal attention by policy determining levels.
3. Contrary to some beliefs in the concepts of decentralized
functions, decisions were not speedily reached, and there was confusion
at times as to what authority had. made the decisions.
);. There was and is "edict" management. However, some view this
7
as a military disciplinary necessity.
£. Weak managers ride on the coat-tails of successful divisions and
trade on past reputations.
This is not to say that the changes which ultimately occurred in
the BASS pattern cured all these problems. In a bureaucracy, perhaps
some of these conditions will always be present. In this study,
centralization or consolidation, as it occurred, will be considered as the
A. V. McCullough. Why Decentralization Fails, Management Review,
XLVIX (August, I960), 52.




combination of some of the major supply support functions in the San
Francisco Bay Area that was required in order to perfect the most
economical operation possible while still maintaining full supply support.
The bad ground research for this study has been draiim from official
Navy directives, memoranda, letters, and unofficial personal letters
between various hierarchical officials in the period since lh March 1958.
In the beginning, a Navy Comptroller Internal Audit of the Mare
Island Navy Shipyard recommended that:
BuSandA consider a plan whereby certain activities would be
assigned responsibility as primary stock points for selected items,
or groups of items, within designated cognizance codes instances
where the specific requirements of the activity concerned indicate
the advisability of such limited responsibility. F 3 ~1
On this basis andthe results of a previous experimental adaptation of the
above recommendation in the Pearl Harbor, Hawaii area, both the Bureau of
Ships and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts recommended that the Comman-
ders of the Mare Island and the San Francisco Naval Shipyards, and the
Commanding Officer, Naval Supply Center, Oakland develop a plan for
realignment of supply support patterns in the San Francisco Bay Area. \h\
The full text of these requirements may be found in Appendix A.
The purpose of the recommendation and the stud;/ was to develop a
support concept which was resigned to reduce complex inventories, improve
storage space utilization, and at the same time maintain responsive
support of operational requirements.
It should be noted at this point that the Shipyard supply departments
were directed to narrow supply support concepts to the parameters of
the support of the industrial shipyard efforts only. This was to be
interpreted by the shipyards as continuing to maintain primary supply
systems stocks of major equipments such as "F" , "S", and "J" cognizance

materials, as well as items of other cognizance materials whose predominant
use by and which, because of their physical characteristics and the location
of the predominant consumer, would be most advantageously carried by a
shipyard.
The existing pattern for providing supply support to active ships in
items of subsistence, clothing, fuel and lubricants was not to be disturbed
by this realignment of supply support responsibilities.
Supply system stocks of all other categories of material were not
to be carried by the shipyards. NSC Oakland was to assume responsibility
for full support of the shipyards and their satellite activities for
items not stocked at the shipyard. For those items not stocked by NSC
Oakland, the shipyards were to continue going directly to the appropriate
source of supply.
1 September 195>8 was established as the target date for the
submission of the completed plan. NSC Oakland, with the concurrence of
the Commandant, 12th Naval District, assumed the responsibility to
coordinate efforts in the formation of the plan and in so doing, proposed
the formation of a Joint Working Group which was to prepare a proposed
plan to include:
1. Action necessary to meet the stated objectives of the ll; March
1958 joint BuShips/BuSandA letter.
2. Estimates of cost to accomplish the recommendations.
3. Alternate means of accomplishment,
h. Time phasing. P?J
Data deemed necessary for the study included:
1. A listing by cognizance symbol of the dollar value of inventory,
the square feet occupied, the dollar value and the measurement tons

issued to:
a. Shipyard industrial use.
b. Satellite Activities support.
2. That portion of 1 above carried in NIF Shop Stores.
.3. The dollar value estimate by cognizance symbol , and the number
of square feet occupied by "S", "F" and "J" cognizance material that the
shipyards did not want to carry,
h. The listing of "G" cognizance items for which shipyards desired
to continue as primary stock points.
£. An estimate of the doll v lues of and the square feet occupied
by those "G" cognizance items to be retained which were in e xcess of the
stockage objectives of a primary stock point.
6. A listing of the satellite activities and the ships supported,
indicai ing the Hollar value and the measurement tonnage by material
cognizance of the support rendered.
The satellite or tenant activities were alarmed by these proposals.
If Oakland was to be their stocking activity, how were the satellite
activities to get rush material? Would. IJot-in-Stoc. isitions be
returned for purchase by the shipyard? How were requisitions to be
processed? Who would expedite urgent needs? What about transportation
costs? Obviously there were many details to be clarified, and indeed,
they would, be, but not until the proposal was sent to Washington. The
outcome of decisions there would release the flood of actions required
in the Bay area support activities to satisfy the needs of these tenant
activities.
The proposals of the Joint Working Group were forwarded to the
Chiefs of the Bureau of Ships and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts on
10 Sept r 1950 in a letter v ici asked that the proposals be
10

considered as a plan which would be peculiar to the San Francisco Bay
area since three large elements of the Navy Supply System, strung along
forty miles of highly congested highways were involved. [6 [See Appendix
B. For this reason, it was felt that a comparison of the BASS pattern
with that of the previously mentioned Pearl Harbor concept would not be
appropriate. The letter also stated:
1. That some coordination with Supply Demand Control Points would
be necessary to determine material which should be disposed of by the
shipyards instead of forwarding it to NSC Oakland for storage.
2. That NSC Oakland had sufficient storage space to absorb all
inventory material which would be forthcoming from the shipyards.
3. That transportation costs would increase.
U. That personnel adjustments would have to be determined as
implementation of the plan took place.
$, That overall savings would result from initiation of the plan.
6. That the plan would definitely affect the funding-split, that
is, the BuSandA financed Military Support would be drastically reduced
and the Navy Industrial Fund would have to assume almost total
administrative and overhead costs of the Shipyard supply departments.
A review of personal and official correspondence originating outside
the San Francisco Bay area about this time indicates that a number of
activities felt that the plan proposed by the Bay area activities did not
go far enough. In general, it appears that the hierarchy at the Washing-
ton level felt that further study was needed to achieve maximum removal
of supply functions from the San Francisco and the Mare Island shipyards.
The barbs of other Inspector General, Navy Area Audit Office and General
Accounting Office investigations were beginning to be felt.
11

For example, it was apparent that the Bureau of S ' : felt that
IISC Oakland should take over more of the shipyard stock n that
envisioned by the Joint Wor i i iroup plan^. Material was not necessar-
ily to be transferred but v.ras to be carried on Oakland's inventory
records. Ship?/a.rds -were to continue to order material for emergency
type work from an ir point in the supply system, but were to record the
demand for that material with NSC Oakland. Shipyards were to retain
title and provide space and handling personnel to NSC Oakland on a
reimburseable basis ; title of some ware] >u s ere to be transferred to
' e Naval Supply Center and on-site supply system effort was to be
accomplished by personnel on the personnel rolls of NSC Oakland, All
of the foregoing would, of course, involve extensive fi Lng, and
personnel ceiling and organization changes. Elimination in the s ip; ards
of Issue, Stock and Receipt Control; some procurement; traffic, storage,
and related material handling functions of the supply system stocks was
advocated, with the subsequent effects on Comptroller, Public Works and
Industrial Relations areas to be kept firmly in mind.
In November of 19!?8, the official BuShips/BuSandA reaction to the
Joint Working Group plan submitted in September was promulgated. £7
J
For complete details oj bhe reaction, see Appendix C. The letter
authorized immediate implementation of actions which allowed the
shipyards to:
1. Discontinue stock U] port of satellite activities except for
items available.
2. Discontinue support of ships berthed at the si ard£ :
for emergency requirements of stock items and "P" cognizance material
pending final implementation of the plan.
12

3. Discontinue processing of excess i iterial turned in by ships
except for "F", "J", "S" and "P" cognizance materials. Such material
as to be accepted only for delivery to NSC Oakland,
Appointment of NSC Oakland as an Outfit Supply Activity was to be held
in abeyance pending later action. The overall consolidation concept was
to be held off pending an evaluation of a more thorough and complete
consolidation of non-industrial supply functions in the Bay area.
The General Stores Supply Office was one of several Supply Demand
9Control Points that objected to this development. It's reaction Kill
be generalljr summarized at this point.
e General Stores Supply Office was disturbed because 2h% of the
total general stores material inventory was located in the three Bay
area activities. Furthermore, these three (out of twenty-six primary
stock p ints for general stores material) supported 22,1 of the total
value of standard general stores material reimburseable issues. The
General Stores Supply Office felt that because of the foregoing factors,
any proposed consolidation actions, regardless of their .-ire:- .at
insignificance, be withheld pending complete analysis of the actions
and that the General Stores Supply Office be given the opportunity to
review the final implementing directive, prior to promulgation by the
Bureaus. The General Stores Supply Office letter further stated that
electronic data processing statistical data studies of general stores
material carried by the three Bay area activities had been initiated to
provide:
1. I + ems common to the three activities or between any two of them.
^General Stores Supply Office letter L8-1 dated 12 December 19^8.
To Chief, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. Subject: Supply Support
Pattern in the San Francisco Bay Area.
13

2. Itmes carried by any ono activity but not by he other t .
3. Twelve monl plenishraenl id values for each of
combinations in (1) and (?) above.
U. Inventory value for each combination in (1) and (2) above.
5. The number of active and inactive items in each combination
in (1) and (2) above.
Specific differences with the Bay area plan letter were r ivi< as
follows
:
1. Item 6a of the NSC Oakland plan letter: To discontinue stock
support of satellite activities.
I Leral Stores Supply Office reply: It is not considered
practicable to ! satellites rendered support on different classes
of material from different activities. On-base satellites should receive
port for all classejB - 1 stor 1 dless of il i yard
supp] ' Lor: tb classes conce] i led.
2. Paragrapl c of t] e NSC Oakls .n letter: SI ii rd ; ould
discontinue processing excess material turned in by a ship.
General Stores Supply Office reply: A shipyard should process
material for which it is primary. If the yard is secondary, it should
process the material to the extent necessary to determine whether a
requirement exists in the yard for the item.. If a requirement exists,
then the yard, should keep the material.
3. Paragraph IB1 of the NSC Oakland plan letter: Delineating
federal classes for which the shipyards arc to be assigned primary
stock point status.
General Stores Supply Office reply: Mote that there are
currently £L3 "GX" cognisance items (or twenty-two percent) out of a
in

total of 22U7 items cataloged in five classes (UOIO, 5315, 5335, 5660
and 5680) otl . r than the classes listed in the plan paragraph IB1. It is
recommended that echelons of supply be based solely on federal classes
rather than on both a class and a fraction breakdown.
h. Par raph IIA2 of the NSC Oakland plan letter: Supply Demand
Control Points discontinue passing requisitions in retail quantities to
shipyard available elsewhere.
: eral Stores Supply Office reply: The General Stores Supply
Office desires to continue to redistribute material on an economical basis.
Therefore if material is available at the shipyards and is required at
nearby activities, it will be redistributed from the shipyards regardless
of whether retail quantities are involved.
As previously stated, the General Stores Sufply Office objections are
herein provided as an illustration of the opposition the BASS consolida-
tion was beginning to encounter. This office was by no means the only
one making itself heard on this matter, as this paper will illustrate.
In December of 1958, the Commandant of the Twelfth Naval District
initiated action to make the NSC Oakland a primary supply point for all
shj s . thed at shipyards in the district effective 1 January 1959* [_8J
The U. S. Navy Radiological Defense Laboratory, a satellite of the San
Francisco Naval Shipyard, was to continue to be supported by the shipyard
until 1 July 1959. If the material w as available, the shipyards were:
1. Required to make emergency issues to ships and shore satellites.
2. To continue to stock and provide support for "P" cognizance
material until a change in logistic responsibility for this material was
implemented.
3. To accept and process and ship turn-ins of excess "F", "J",
15

"P" and "S" cognizance material, scrap and salvage material. All other
material turned in by ships was to be forwarded to NSC Oakland.
The San Francisco Naval Shipyard, in an uncirculated status report,
indicated that BASS would allow a probable savings of sixty-five people
in fiscal year i960, increasing to 80 people by fiscal year 1962.
However, with the advent of electronic data processing, elimination of
36,000 items of dead stock and 1 Lon of the Commandant, Twelfth
Naval District notice of 29 December 19!?8, it was est: ate'd at total
savings of only seventy- nine people could be achieved by fiscal year 1962,
Therefore, the shipyard did not feel that the BuShips-BuSandA plan could
be justified on the basis of personnel economy. As can be seen, other
doubt was rising on the success horizon of tl e consolidation plan.
However, lest this feeling become rampant, the two bureaus issued
a new directive which not only supported that which had previously been
promulgated, but put some teeth in it. \9\ For full details see Appendix
D. This was necess&vj. The pressure of the various inspection and audit
teams had been felt to the extent that fiscal year i960 funds were 0:
to be cut at the budget r< level based upon the estimates of savin
which coulc be realized upon the consolidation recommended. Since the
originally submitted plan from the Bay area activities did not, in the
Bureau viewpoint, envision either a substantial consolidation of supply
functions or an estimate of savings potential, the Bureaus had not been in
a position to concur or disagree with the amount of savings estimated
during the budget review. The Bureaus did agree however that potential
savings of both men and at rial were of sufficient significance to
warrant a more comprehensive local analysis. Maximum consolidation of
supply system functions into the NSC Oaklanc with the retention of a
16

supply liaison and a purchase [-roup within the shipyards was to be
considered. Other patterns of supply support merited considerable study
and cost evaluation. Those patterns to be considered v.rere:
1. To continue the shipyards as distribution activities, but
discontinue shipyard supply inventories which duplicated items in NIF
Shop Stores. NIF Shop Stores were to be expanded in range and depth if
necessary, and were to be replenished direct, from NSC Oakland.
2. To discontinue shipyard supply departments and reassign residual
industrial supply functions to a material division of the shipyard
Planning or Production Departments.
3« To realign primary and secondary supply support responsibilities
in such a manner as to eliminate duplication of any cognizance symbol, or
classes between the shipyards and the NSC Oakland, similar to the Pearl
harbor consolidation.
In studying these various possible supply support patterns the Bay area
activities were requested to realistically evaluate additional planning,
scheduling, transportation and follow-up costs. In addition, there were
requirements for proposed, adjustments of existing organization structures,
staffing and funding needs; an estimate of extra costs involved in the
consolidation process and the listing of residual problem areas requiring
resolution at the Navy Department level along with recommended, solutions.
Speed was essential. Proposals were due back in Washington by 1
March 195>9. Phased implementation was to be contemplated, with the intent
that action could be well underway by 1 July 19^9. To emphasize Bureau
belief in this project, Bureau personnel were to be sent to the west




Simultaneously, the Bureau of Sxipplies and Accounts requested the
various inventory managers involved to review supply inventories of the
two shipyards, identify system excesses to shipyards stocks wherever
possible and dispose of them.
Despite the loss of various pertinent shipyard supply functions,
the shipyards were to continue as Outfit Supply Activities. The source
for "Supply Officer Furnished Material was to be shifted to NSC Oakland.
This particular matter will be discussed at a later point in this paper.
To supplement the lh January joint Bureau letter, the Chief, Bureau
of Supplies and Accounts, on 10 February ordered the two shipyards to
order no material in excess of stockage objectives and to dispose of
material in excess of system requirements to prevent unnecessary fund
expenditure in material relocation curing consolidation. Primary
emphasis was to be applied at the San Francisco Naval Shipyard to permit
release of le ased storage space and relieve congested warehouse facilities
there. All inventory reduction action was to be completed by 31 May
1959. [l6]
The action taken by one of the Supply Demand Control Points because
of this contemplated, action will be the subject of the next portion of
this chapter.
SUBMARINE SUPPLY OFFICE PJiiSPONSE ("P" Cognizance Material) .
This office, during it's physical move to the Mechanic sburg,
Pennsylvania area, directed that all "P" cognizance material at the two
shipyards except the following material was to be transferred to the Naval
Supply Center Oakland:
10Submarine Supply Office letter Pl/l^OO dated 26 February 1959.
To Chief, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.
18

1. NIF Shop Stores material.
2. Limited quantities (ninety day levels) of fast moving items to
supplement, but not duplicate, NIF Shop Stores items.
3. Those major items specified by the NSC Oakland used
predominantly in the industrial effort of the shipyards. This category
would include battery jars, periscopes, etc.
Mare Island Naval Shipyard, a substantial holder of "P" cognizance
material was to transfer one composite tender load of that material to
the NSC San Diego, which v„ras to become a primary distribution point
for "P" cognizance material.
After both shipyards had completed, transfers to the NSC Oakland,
the • F/ere to oved from the distribution system of the Submarine
Supply Office.
Mare Island Naval Shipyard disagreed with the Submarine Supply
Office proposals in that it:
1. Wanted to keep limited quantities of fast moving items, whether
they duplicated NIF Shop Stores material or not.
2. Did not want the NSC Oakland, but the Submarine Supply Office
to specif;/ major items to be retained by shipyards in view of that office's
technical knowledge of material involved.
3. Desired to regain a reporting activity for major items and
become a non-reporting secondary for the limited quantities of the fast
moving items retained and wanted Oakland to develop reservation procedures
for s ' mlanned "P" cognisance requirements.
On 23 March, the NSC Oakland stated that it felt that the
Commander, Mare Island Naval Shipyard letter dated 18 March 19E>9
•
To Commanding Officer, Naval Supply Center, Oakland. Sub j : Distribution
Plan for "P" Cognisance Material at West Coast Activities; implementation of,
19

Submarine Supply Office must aid in determination of those major items
that should be retained by the shipyards and that stock records and status
reporting for these items should also be retained by the shipyards. In
addition, it acknowledged that there would be an overlap of fast moving
items and items in NIF Shop Stores at Mare Island Naval Shipyard due to
the fact that NIF Shop Stores is mainly fast moving items and duplication
was therefore bound to exist. San Francisco Naval Shipyard was not
12involved since it had no NIF Shop Store for "P" Cognizance material.
Simultaneously, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts stated that
exceptions to total transfer of "P" cognizance material from shipyards
to the NSC Oakland were as follows:
1. Items in NIF Shop Stores.
2. Ninety day level of items to supplement NIF Shop Stores.
3. Major items used mainly in shipyard industrial efforts.
h. Composite Tender load of >![00 items to the NSC San Diego. *
On IS April, the Commanding Officer, Naval Supply Center, Oakland
advise d the Submarine Supply Office that the Mare Island Naval Shipyard
was scheduled for transfer of material to the NSC Oakland commencing in
May, with material moving by federal class, in sequence, and hoped to
complete the transfer by lU August 1959. San Francisco Naval Shipyard
was expected to ship the same material at the same time. The May date
was stated because this would occur after the movement of the Tender
12Commanding Officer, Naval Supply Center, Oakland letter dated
23 March 19^9. To Commanding Officer, Submarine Supply Office. Subj
:
Distribution Plan for "Pn Cognizance Material at West Coast Activities;
implementation of.
"°Chief, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts letter dated 21; March 19!?9»
To Commanding Officer, Naval Supply Center, Oakland. Sub j : Transfer of
"P" Cognizance Material; implementation of.
20

Load to San Diego had been completed and that 30 June 1959 looked like
a good date to designate the NSC Oakland as a distribution point inasmuch
as approximately fifty percent of the material would then be on hand in
Oakland with gradually increasing percentages being available. Demands
for stock would be referred feither to shipyards for issue or back to the
Submarine and Reactor Parts Supply Office ( which by now was the new
name of the old Submarine Supply Office).
The Submarine and Reactor Parts Supply Office then listed major
items to be transferred from the San Francisco Naval Shipyard to the
Mare Island Naval Shipyard, All fast moving items not attritable to a
ninety day level within six months were to be transferred, to ' JO
Oakland. By October 19'?9j the San Francisco Naval Shipyard was to be
out of the stock status reporting business except regarding transaction
reports on battery jars and covers. San Francisco Naval Shipyard
operated a Battery Repair program.
A later Submarine and Reactor Parts Supply Office letter s
supply levels for the fast-moving items except for "X" fraction-cod
items
:
1. Safety Level One Month.
2. Stockage Objective Three Months,
3. Requisitioning Objective Four Months.
The level of supply for "X" fraction-coded items stocked by the Mare
Island Naval Shipyard was to be maintained by the Submarine and Reactor
-6
Parts Supply Office.
^"Submarine and Reactor Parts Supply Office letter dated 8 May 1959.
To Commander, San Francisco Naval Shipyard.
-'Submarine and Reactor Parts Supply Office letter dated 29 May 19^9.
To Commanders, Mare Island and San Francisco Naval Shipyards. Sub j : Levels
of Supply for "P" Cognizance Material; establishment of.
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As the foregoing illustration indicates, most problem areas vrere
being resolved, once tine and understanding entered the scene. Similar
situations had to be resolved with a number of the other Supply Demand
Control Points.
In the meantime, personnel of the shipyards were becoming more
apprehensive about their future status. Runors were a dime a dozen.
Action taken in this area will be the subject of the next portion of
this chapter.
PERSONNEL PROBLEMS .
To help clear the air of some of the rumors, the Supply Officer
of the San Francisco Naval Shipyard in a memorandum dated 2 March 1°59
,
informed all Supply Department personnel that a study of the supply
support pattern in the Bay area was being made and that results were to
be forwarded to the Navy Department in March and that early action on
it was expected.
On 3 August 19^9, the same employees were further advised that the
BASS plan had been executed and that action would be in the form of
individual actions •>imed at reducing stock levels, with a resultant
loss of personnel. Since the amount of stock reduction and the dates
of accomplishment had not been specified, it was assumed that the actions
would take place over an extended period of time and that ordinary
attrition of personnel would accomplish necessary personnel adjustments
and. that no Reduction-In-Force would be necessary.
It is to be noted that personnel cuts and resultant lowering of
costs did not occur quite as planned. For example, at the San Francisco
Naval Shipyard, increased janitorial services required by a new tenant in
the Supply building, an increase of workload for the new Supply Overhaul
22

Availability Program, and parallel electronic data processing/electronic
accounting machine operations on Shop Stores functions required additional
personnel as did the additional duties acquired by the shipyard for the
Assistant Industrial Manager, which had merged into the shipyard.
Here again, anticipated change did occur, but other commitments
nulled the possible savings.
To carry on now with the historical review, it is noted that
material availability information in the Bay area was not a matter of
major concern, especially in regard to planned requirements material.
A system was already established whereby a :•' i] rard forwarded advance
material requirements listings via prepunched detail cards. These cards
were then offset, compared with NSC Oakland material and advice of status
was forwarded to the shipyards within two days. Y«hether the shipyard
then pulled the material or took a chance on it being available when
it was needed was up to the shipyard. In any case, supply action usually
s not taken by the shipyard supply department until a fir- 1 request
was received from the shj - Prod iction or 1 ! ting Dei artment. 11
For so^e time novr, the three activities involved in the consolidation
had been weighing a number of proposed plans for the change of the Bay
Area Support Pattern. In addition to the plans already presented, two
more plans, numbers VI and VII had been evolved, as extensions or expansions
of Plan II by the San Francisco Naval Shipyard and the Naval Supply Center,
Oakland. Plans I and II can be found in Appendices E and F respectively.
Private correspondence between one shipyard and the Bureau of Ships
expressed the following preferences for the proposed plans:
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Plan Number NSC Oakland MINS SFNS
I h h h
II 3 l 1
VI 2 2 2
VII 1 3 3
Table I on pages 2^ and 26 illustrates the comparable features of the
plans and Table II on pages 27, 28 and 29 illustrates the possible changes
in navy shipyard functions brought about by the four plans.
Activity reactions to plans VI and VII are included in Appendices E
and F.
Officially, the three activities agreed that further improvements and
savings could be achieved through extension of Plan II. These possibilities
included:
1. Farther reduction in range and depth of items carried at the
shipyards.
2. Some degree of inventory control and stores accounting consolida-
tion.
Further, the Bay area activities agreed, that:
1. Plan I -was not acceptable in that it did. not meet savings criteria
set forth in the BuShips-BuSandA joint letter of lU January 195>9. The two
shipyards also felt that Plan I did not provide them with essential control
over material availabilit;/ and procurement in support of the industrial
effort.
2. Plan II offered substantial savings to the Servicev;ide Supply
and Finance appropriation (SWSN) and was an evolutionary means of attaining
supply support realignment in the Bay area.




COMPARATIVE FEATURES OF PROPOSED BAY AREA SUPPORT PLANS
I. STOCKS CARRIED AT NAVAL SHIPYARDS




A. Industrial Classes of G, H,
N, P, and Z
B. Non-Industrial Classes of
G, H, N, P, and Z
YES YES MINIMAL MINIMAL
MINIMAL REDUCED MINIMAL MINIMAL
C. Cogs F, J, and S Positioned Items Only-
II. SUPPLY ECHELON OF NAVAL SHIPYARDS
A. Non-Industrial Classes of AUXILIARY NON- NON- AUXILIARY
G, H, N, P, and Z
B. Industrial Classes of
G, H, N, P, and Z
C. Cogs F, J, and S
III. SUPPLY OPERATIONS
A. N3C0 Handle NSY Planned
Requirements as Requested
by NSYs.
B. NSCO Provide Availability
Information
C. NSCO Bill Direct to NIF
when End-Use
D. Issues from Stocks at NSY
on Post-Posting Basis
STORE OF REPORTING REPORTING STORE OF
NSCO SECONDARY SECONDARY NSCO



































F. NSCO Prime Source of Supply YES YES YES YES
Officer Furnished Material
for Fitting Out Program,
(1) No, except as presently performed by Naval Shipyard San Francisco
under its rapid issue system.
NSY - Naval Shipyard
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future expansion and extension of Plan II. This item has been explained
at length previously.
Bay Area Supply Support Data as required is contained in Tables
IIIA and IIIB on pages 31 and 32.
This plethora of opinions and information was forwarded to the Navy
Department on 2k April 195°. [l2~|
While Washington deliberated on the proposed Plans, the shipyards
busied themselves making studies of situations which would arise if one
plan or the other was adopted.
The BASS juggernaut was beginning to move.
Communications became a matter of concern. A change in the Bay area
supply support pattern would necessitate more rapid written communications
in order to link the three activities. This was needed to provide prompt
supply response for industrial efforts of the shipyards. Accordingly,
the NSC Oakland initiated a request for a teletype circuit to connect the
iISC Oakland with the two shipyards. Coot of the leased, commercial land
lines was estimated to be approximately $lrpO»00 per lontl . 13
It is interesting to note at this point the activity going on outside
the Ba.y area concerning the realignment.
In early June, Washington officials, in private correspondence, let it
be known that they were not completely satisfied with the 2I4. April study.
More information was required regarding such items as:
1. Staffing at all Bay area sites.
2. Since the NSC Oakland had already assumed the bulk of off-
station suprort tasks of the shipyards, what was the basis for additional




BAY AREA SUPPLY SUPPORT DATA
I. COMPARISON OF STANDARD ITEM'S CARRIED AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1958
COGNIZANCE MARE ISLAND SAN FRANCISCO NSC OAKLAND
F 3,129 1,576 2,U10
G 2U, 856 21,651* 1*6,812
H 20, 5U3 26,959 75,599
J 1,U27 739 8,50U
N 2U,572 33,168 106,09U
P 22,5UU 7,983 520
S 1,577 987 i,n5
Z 9,539 5,162 9U,293
TOTALS 108,187 98,228 335, 3U7
II. DOLLAR VALUE STANDARD ITEMS CARRIED AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1958
COGNIZANCE MARE ISLAND SAN FRANCISCO NSC OAKLAND
F • 3U,U18,870 18,562,58U 5U,936,892
G 16,058, 0U8 10,972,789 57,208,3UU
H 26,703,795 7,723,935 56,328,827
J 59,912,878 12,6UU,l5U 26,133, 20U
N 3,893,610 2,1;99,710 56,U35,3U7
P 8,605,375 1,LU2,555 30,685
S 27,909,662 8,19U,3ii2 8,289,305
Z 18,972,529 5,109,857 129,05ti,9UO




BAY AREA SUPPLY SUPPORT DATA
III. MEASUREMENT TONS STORED AT NAVAL SHIPYARDS AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1958
(In Thousands)
v
COGNIZANCE MARE ISLAND SAN FRANCISCO TOTAL
F 38.5 12.3 50.8
G 168.7 73.6 2U2.3
H UU.8 6.5 - 51.3
J 38.3 5.5 U3.8
N 6.0 2.2 8.2
P 1U.6 1.1 15.7
S 91.0 2.0 93.0
Z 21.U U.o 25.U
TOTALS U23.3 107.2 530.5




MARE ISLAND SAN FRANCISCO NSC OAKLAND
% NSYs
TO NSCO
G 11,575 8,711 UO,638 502
H 2,123 2,716 2U,717 20#
N 3,632 3,807 U9,015 152
P 2,012 31U - 9% of
Z 679 UlU 28,587 h%
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3. What was NSC Oakland's estimation of stock relocation costs
from the shipyards to the NSC Oakland?
U. What was the estimated net savings for fiscal year 1961 in the
Servicewide Supply and Finance appropriation?
5. Would relocation of stock to the NSC Oakland cause undue
congestion of available space, significant rewarehousing, etc?
The Electronics Supply Office, in private correspondence, did not
particularly care whether the shipyards became secondary (non-reporting)
activities for "N" cognizance material or not. The Ships Parts Control
Center, meanwhile, was emphatically opposed to the shipyards becoming
secondary stock points. That office felt that:
1. Each shipyard was an important outlet in it's system and that
it lost too much control over an essential part of it's inventory. The
Mare Island Naval Shipyard inventory at that time was estimated by the
Ships Parts Control Center to be twenty-five million dollars with sales
of only one million dollars. This was an amount of inventory that was
admitted to be far too large.
2. That each shipyard also held "Critical" items whose control
the Shins Parts Control Center could not afford to lose.
3. Tl e 3' ips Parts Control Center's budget was already being
attacked for having too much inventory at secondary stock points.
All these problems and questions hung suspended without resolution
until 2 July 19?9, when Washington's optimum support plan was issued. lU
Details of this ^lan may be found in Appendix G. While the answer was
probably not in the precise terms hoped for by the Bay area activities,
it did order movement towards consolidation. BuShips and BuSandA felt
that the decisions it had arrived at would:
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1. Insure that both shipyards would have responsibility and
authority for control of material availability and procurement required
in support of their efforts.
2. Reduce non-industrial support load on the shipyards.
3. Reduce range and depth of selected stocks at shipyards not
related to their industrial operations.
U. Accomplish maximum personnel savings without hampering supply
support in the area.
5. Involve a minimum of material movement.
Agreements reached by the two bureaus were not presented in the manner of
a formalized plan. Implementation was to be in the form of a series of
joint Bureau actions. Those actions vrere to:
1. Direct discontinuance of routine redistributions from shipyard
stocks.
2. Prescribe a tailored support plan for each lal cat.
(Shipyards were to remain primary stock points for certain co u .ces
and classes of material as agreed -with the cognizant Su] I Demand Control
Point. The shipyards r;ere, however, to be considered oi Lfied primary
stock points in that they would not normally be called upon to serve as
distribution points.)
3. Reduce material input to the si Lp rds.
U. Determine an< • ' ec disposal actions.
£. Determine and direct required bu] Lons.
The bureauo also felt that the agreements would impose new requirements
on the Bay Area activities such as:
1. The NSC Oakland would be required to reserve material in stock
and procure and reserve other material when requested by the shipyards.
3U

2. The NSC Oakland would bill NIF directly for items immediately
chargeable to shipyard end use.
3. The NSC Oakland was to consider yard demands as replenishable.
The NSC Oakland was to provide material availability of stocks
at the Center to the shipyards.
£. Shipyards were to follow prescribed criteria for operating levels
of supply in determining the range and depth of stocks of items with
repetitive usage.
The Bureaus believed then, that these arrangements would produce maximum
savings and provide su] ply system responsiveness. YJhether all this was
to be accomplished ma;/ be noted in Chapter III.
Several Supply Demand Control Points were quick to react to the
basic plan. Groundwork had been laid, so that promulgation of their
proposed plans w as not as slow as it might have otherwise have been. ll^J
The shipyards too, had a good deal of their stocks moved to the Naval
Si pply Center, Oakland and were engaged in stock screening operations to
determine stock to be retained and stock to be transferred or disposed of.
On 7 A.U list 19^9} BuSandA issued an instruction in this regard. 1 16 I
It reiterated the elimination of non-industrial support by the yards.
Each shipyard was to maintain an intact Supply Department whose function
was to maintain support to it's own industrial effort. Each shipyard
was changed from a primary to a secondary stock point, contrary to some
of the previous stands made by some of the Supply Demand Control Points.
Range and depth determinations were to be made, then the excess material
was to be disposed of or redistributed where required. Any stock
remaining in excess was to be moved to Oakland by 31 March I960,
Quarterly reports of actions taken were to submitted to the Bureau
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of Supplies and Accounts commencing on 1$ Oc ! .
The Electronics Supply Office held a conference with the Bay area
activities and reached agreements basically in accordance with the BuSandA
directive and on the fourt. Au list, the . i - . by
ssage, to discontinue transaction reporting on Vj> August arid assume
status as a secondary stock Ln1 simultaneously. The General Sto.
J ply Office, on 19 August 19b/1 , forwarded a material listing disclosing
'•
i La] believed n c cy for n • bion in the shi] r< s,
requesting the ship rds to stock all other general stores material in




c I as not to include Laim : its, I common
thirty of 1 year 1?60 and ritil i1 hat
opti i bilization of cesses was being achieved. Other S1
Demand Control Points concerned in the realignment proposed similar
pro,. i design d bo satisfy each activii ic rned. |17|
v . d Lnite] m the move. S n Francisco Naval
Shipyard, by 31 August 195>9 was carrying 25,00' .. r items than in
December of 19^8. The Mare Island Naval Shi] yard was, by 1 August 195>9,
down by almost 61,000 items fron April of 1958.
However, confusion over the Bureau letter reigned supreme. Contrary
>
: to it and some of the Supply Demand Control Point directives, the
shipyards were still primaries for "G" , "11" and "P" cognizance materials,
and Bureau controlled cognizance materials. On 1$ October 1939, a follow-up
request was sent to the Bureau of Supplj.es and Accounts requesting the
status of teletype communications -the ! activities. The San
Francisco Naval Shipyard felt that it was to be relieved of the Fleet




However the Bureau of Ships ordered retention of the Pool at the
shipyard. llO
J
At this point, it nay be stated that the profusion of correspondence
available to this writer was astronomical, both in amount and in the
subjects covered. There will be no attempt made here to delineate or
condense the material. It is believed sufficient to state that
inventories at thetwo shipyards continued to drop as did the on-board
personnel counts of the shipyards. Demands on the shi.r rard supply
systems fell off, but then so did fleet issues, redistribution issues,
stock receipts, Not-In-Stocks, and gross effectiveness conditions while
net effectiveness increased agreeably. 119 I Operating expenses were
decreasing slightly in spite of the added programs in which the shipyards
were involved.
The introduction of computers was speeding the movement of documents
and inventory reviews. Out of date procedures established by some of the
Supply Demand Control Points for secondary stock points were causing
difficulties. The shipyards requested permission to go to weekly review
of active items and order then, if at the reorder point, vice waiting for
quarterly ordering as required, by the established procedures. The
request was heartily endorsed by the Naval Supply Center, Oakland. I 20 I
The request, however, was denied by BuSandA on 1 February i960 on the
basis that new instructions were in the offing regarding stockage
objectives that would provide conversion to a new technique by 30 June
i960. Interim procedures were therefore reasonably considered inadvisable,
[a]
On Vj> January I960, the Chief of Naval Operations finally approved
the NSC Oakland request for teletype communication circuits for the
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interconnection of the three Bay area activities. J22j BuSandA, on 26
J nuary 19^0, forwarded the necessary orders and funds to the Commandant,
Twelfth Naval District. [~23| Necessary abbreviations, message control
procedures and requisition message formats for use on the teletype
circuit v,rere proposed by the Naval Supply Center, Oakland and were
agreed with in their entirety by the two shipyards. \2l7\
On l£ February i960, the NSC Oakland began the so-called Bay Area
Local Delivery program. 251 It consisted of a consolidation of many
types of deliveries being made from the Naval Supply Center, OaldLand and
provided daily delivery service to the shipyards.
The teletype communication system was to be made operational by 30
June I960. I 26I The system was to handle all priority material requests,
stock status inquiries, requisition follow-ups, and release of planned
1 [uirements for material.
It was inherent in a procedural change of the BASS pattern magnitude
that many roblems would arise. Wise counsel decided that prudence
d< , ided a BASS committee in which to pool the thoughts of the activities
involved to aid in resolving these problems. The Naval Supply Center,
Oakland • roposed a first meeting for 27 January 1961, at which each
activity was to be ^represented. The first meeting was actually held on 21
February. At this first BASS meeting, it was agreed that areas for future
consideration included such items as:
1. Revision of monetary ceilings for return of excess material.
2. Necessity for standardization of forms.
3. Necessity for standardization of planned requirements procedures.
km Improvement of Supply responsiveness of the Naval Supply Center.
In addition to the meetings, the Naval Supply Center established a Bay
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Area Service Unit to improve the Center's shipyard service under the
BASS Plan. This service provided a single contact point for:
1. Furnishing requisition status information.
2. A review of pass actions.




At this joint, leave will be taken of the background material
to the change of the Bay Area Supply Support Pattern. It is sufficient
to state that the halting starts of the juggernaut were beginning to
ease and smooth out. What has occurred since mid-1960 3.nd the present and





THE BASS PATTERN: DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS
I. DIAGNOSIS
As previously stated in Chapter I, this paper has been prepared on
the basic assumption that the centralization concept in the San Francisco
Bay Area was both sound and needed.
To comprehend the magnitude of the changes inaugurated by the
original 195>8 Washington correspondence in terms of urset informal
organizations and bureaucratic hierarchies is beyond the scope of this
paper. The intent has been to propound the blacks and whites of that
which has occurred to the formal organizations of the BASS pattern.
Not to be forgotten are the changes which -.-ere and are being
wrought in the Navy Supply System during the pattern change. Priority
systems have been changed twice, computers have arrived; and the Defense
Supply Agency with it's Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue
Procedures and Transportation and Movement Procedures has come on the
scene with far-reaching impact. All of these innovations tended to
complicate the change of the pattern.
There is no doubt that the intent of the bureaus "was to consolidate
supply functions in the Bay area in order to increase economy and
efficiency of operations in that area.
Bearing in mind that the organizational background is a military
one, it must nevertheless be stated that many of the procedures used by
all concerned were not necessarily in recognized good management tech-
niques. To illustrate the foregoing statement, the outstanding fault
of the -hole procedure is the lack of real understanding between the
parties involved. Changes in established procedures were promulgated
Ho

on the BuShips-BuSandA level Tilth little or no apparent consultation with
the Bay area activities. Admittedly, the initial 19^8 correspondence
solicited a study on consolidation possibilities, but was so general that
it lead to a long delay in actual inauguration of the program. Even then,
the final product was not what the Bureaus had originally intended.
Secondly, it is felt that the BASS pattern change could have been
more speedily expedited and have resulted in an operation more satisfactory
to the activities involved if the offices at the Washington level had
represented themselves in the Bay area during the study desired in order
to understand the real problems in the field. A change in procedure
nearly always meets with opposition, but if it can be tempered with
understanding and appreciation, less resistance and a speedier resolvement
of the problem will often result.
While the whole support pattern comes under this purview, illustra-
tional attention is drawn to a more specific case, to witj the 1°62
assignment of the Naval Supply Center, Oakland as the Outfit Supply
Activity for new construction and major conversion ships in the Bay area.
28 Although this subject was approached in Appendices B and C, no
activity in the Bay area was aware that policy was in preparation in
this regard until the letter arrived on the West coast. An Outfit
Supply Activity at this period in time, was responsible for the determin-
ation, procurement and assembly of repair parts, spare parts, tools,
and portable equipments provided to new construction or major conversion
ships. Repair parts provisioning was usually obtained through cooperation
between the shipyards and the various Supply Demand Control Points
involved.
The consternation caused by the directive was matched by the lack
ui

of understanding on practically all levels concerned as to how it should
be implemented. For example:
1. The San Francisco Bay Area segment of the Board of Insrection
and Survc : nothing about the directive. Because of this, the
responsibility, as far as the Board of Inspection and Survey was
concerned, remained with the shipyards. This was, essentially,
responsibility without the means of insuring compliance to outfitting
requirements. The ultimate reaction was for the shipyards involved to
request authority to outfit each ship individually. Since this authority
was granted, the effect of the original directive was destroyed.
Other factors lacking, consideration in the original Outfit Supply
Activity Transfer letter were:
1. Origination and transfer of allowance pages and designation of
the activities to receive them.
2. Transfer of funds.
3. On-load responsibilities for binned and bulk materials.
U. Binning operations and procedures.
5. Separation of outfitting and fitting-out functions and responsi-
bilities. This arrangement complicated the already difficult provisioning
process for a prospective supply officer unnecessarily.
While the military operates on a principle of obedience to a lawful
order, it is becoming more and more obvious that the parties involved in
major business decision should take part in that decision.
Returning again to the diagnosis, the author feels, intuitively,
that ."! ile many of the counter-proposal actions advanced by the Bay area
re delaying tactics towards what ultimately would have to
happen, he is not in a position to make such a charge. However, it is
U2

believed that if pressure of sufficient magnitude, with equivalent
understanding had been applied from the beginning, the further consoli-
dation taking place in 1965 would have occurred in the initial 1959-1960
phase.
For example, the vacillations in the approach to t! A >S ittern
taken by some of the Supply Demand Control Points should have been closely
monitored by BuSandA and the necessary pressures applied at these points
to prevent the confusions that developed on the user levels especially
in regard to reporting status, planned requirements, not-in-stock
procedures, etc.
At this point too, we consider the fact that much of what did occur
officially in the BASS pattern was in the form of letters. True, this
did provide inter-co^munications between the activities concerned, but as
is noted, many of the proposals made by the Bay area activities were
ignored by Washington execution plans. Again, this is a prerogative of
the decision-making level in the military organization. But, if this is
the case, it is hard to understand why the orders which eventually c ane
down, were not in the form, of regular directives instead of letters. Did
these letters allow for further counterproposals from Bay area activities?
This question, alas, is unanswered.
In the beginning, the basic changes in the BASS pattern proposed by
the two Bureaus were those contained in Appendix A. After the movement
of a vast amount of correspondence, the four plans proposed in Appendices
B, C, E, and F and under consideration in Washington were ignored as to
detail. This is shown by the letter contained in Appendix G, which is
not too different fron the original Bureau proposal in Appendix A. It
is true that several items under consideration in the four plans were
U3

later promulgated as procedure changes but -why should an implementing
letter be so generalized? This too remains unanswered.
The diagnosis continues with Tables IV and V on pages \\$ and I4.6
providing final report data submitted by the shipyards to the Bureau
of Ships and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts after one year under the
revised BASS plan. A review of the tables indicates that the expected
results were being obtained. Declines in personnel, inventories,
shipments and receipts as well as increases in savings and net availa-
bility had been achieved.
The Fund Split of the shipyards, as predicted in Chapter II, did.
change. San Francisco Naval Shipyard for example, moved from a BuSandA/
NIF funding split of H9/Oi in the first quarter of fiscal year 1939
to a split of 33/67 in the third quarter of fiscal year 1965.
The BASS meetings, mentioned in Chapter II, continued regularly
until May of 19 61; when they were terminated by mutual consent of the
three activities. 31 Perusal of the meeting minutes over the years
indicates that most of the meetings were "get NSC Oakland." sessions.
Many of the problems were being resolved through less formal methods,
thus negating the need for and the value of the meetings.
Tne much sought after teletype system was disestablished in June
1962 for the San Francisco Naval Shipyard and in July 1962 for the
Mare Island Naval Shipyard. |32| The application of Navy Standard
Re juisitioning and Issue Procedures with the speed and. new methods of
obtaining information they provided, nullified the need for the slow
teletype system and it was abandoned.
1 /
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The Naval Supply Center, Oakland Customer Service Unit, established
early in the BASS pattern change, provided immediate availability on all
shipyard emergency needs and provided walk-through service on such needs.
j.33 1 Personnel from the shipyards were assigned to this emergency need
task and performed the walk-through procedures daily,
j 3U| The Center
performed a marvelous service in this area.
II. PROGNOSIS
To say that all went well with BASS would be a most naive assumption
or statement. Many procedural difficulties il/vere encountered and resolved.
The overall effect, however, was one of gradual improvement. Inventories,
as shown in Figure One on page I48, and with the exception of a brief
upward trend during the Berlin crisis in 1962, continued downward. Mare
Island Shipyard line item count was 20,735 while the San Francisco Naval
Shipyard count was only 12,687. This count occurred in December l 6Iw
Shipyard material receipts have generally been up since 1962, while stock
issues have been generally down. These trends are shown in Figures Two
and Three on pages k9 and 5>0. Figures Four and Five on pages 5>1 and $2
provide Gross and Nel}- Availabilities of material at the two shipyards.
At Mare Island, both Gross and Net Availabilities have continued, downward
generally, while at the San Francisco Naval Shipyard, the Gross Avail-
ability has continued downward while the net availability has continued
generally upward as would be expected.
When one considers that an increase in Mare Island material receipts
has been accomplished with less personnel, it speaks well of the efficiency
17
prompted by the BASS pattern change.
^"'Mare Island Naval Shipyard First Quarter Supply Department High-
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The BASS pattern change has resulted in an increase in Direct
Material Inventories and Navy Industrial Fund Shop Store inventories.,
and, consequently, inventory value. Further increase in the future
could normally have been anticipated. However certain circumstances have
been introduced into the BASS scheme of things that -were not contemplated
when work on this paper commenced.
In November I96I4., the Secretary of Defense announced the closure
-i o
and/or the consolidation of a number of military bases. Included in
this announcement was the consolidation of the Mare Island and the San
Francisco Naval Shipyards. This change, along with a move toward more
mature computer equipment that is more compatible with other shipyards
and the rest of the U. S. Navy with the need to know, has considerably
19
altered the prognosis that would originally have been offered. That
prognosis being in consonance with the original bureau centralization
concepts. Although substantial benefits have thus far been achieved by
the BASS pattern change, the Bureaus of Ships and Supplies and Accounts
both felt that the program had not gone far enough. The consolidation
of the shipyards now provided the flux to put some of these concepts into
being. This approach was especially easy to pursue when it was determined
that the consolidation was largely concerned with a centralization of the
following functions of the two shipyards to be headquartered at I
Island:
1. Data Processing
"^nffith Courage and Good Sense, Time LXXXVIX (November 27, 196U), 29.
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Hearing before the Subcommittee on Census and. Government Statistics
of the Committee on the Post Office and the Civil Service, House of Repre-
sentatives. Eighty-eighth Congress-First Session (11 June 1963),









0. Medical and Dental
9. Administrative.
The two shipyards are to be called the San Francisco Bay Navy Yard. The
new yard will have two divisions, a Mare Island and a Hunters Point
Division. The Command is to be assumed by a Commander of the Mare Island
and the Hunters Point Divisions respectiveljr.
What now was to become of the individual yard supply systems?
The Hunters Point Supply Officer is to be directly responsible to the
Commander of that division and is to retain industrial supply functions.
The Bureau of Ships is strongly urging the transfer of all non-industrial
supply functions to the NSC, Oakland instead of to Mare Island. The
Bureau also feels that, in addition to greater cost savings, there are
also other benefits:
1. Since Hunters Point has appreciably less main inventory than
Mare Island, a two-stage transfer v.rill make it easier for Oakland to
absorb all non-industrial supply functions, which is the Bureau's ultimate
goal.
2. Will Simplify computer processing of main inventory at Mare
Island.
3. Will be less likely to create double handling and cross hauling
SU

of material because of shipment to the wrong location.
h. Should streamline Hunters Point's requisitioning channels.
5« Will permit an evaluation of the effectiveness of the realignment
plan prior to full implementation. |3£ |
In the event of Oakland's inability to absorb the added workload, it is
considered that the industrial supply organizations at both locations
should be identical and that Mare Island should establish within its
Supply Department an organization concerned with non-industrial supply
functions to the extent considered practicable and economical. In
addition to the supply problem, the compatible computer system mentioned
earlier and now called the Management Information System is to be evolved
by a joint Bureau/Navy Yard effort including detailed study and analyses
in which the Bureau will assist and participate.
The general concept of the New Industrial Supply Departments is to bei
1. Mare Island and San Francisco Naval Shipyards (now renamed as
Divisions) will establish Industrial Supply Departments to perform
functions of:
a. Navy Industrial Fund Shop Stores.
b. Direct Material Inventory.
c. Purchase ($25>00 limitation with continuation of unlimited
procurement authority for Mare Island "SX" material).
d. Organic technical capability.
2. The Naval Supply Center, Oakland will assume responsibility for
the furnishing of complete supply support for material previously
furnished from main inventory and the replenishment of NIF Shop stores.
No stores returns, Financial Inventory Control Record or Navy Stock Fund
allotment accounting will remain at the shipyards.
'6 c!

3. The Naval Supply Center Oakland will assure responsibility for
supply support of satellites.
km As necessary, shop stores stocks will be increased.
5. All non-technical main inventory bin and bulk materials will be
physically transferred to the NSC Oakland.
6. Technical material and other material with a primary shipyard
use application, will remain at the shipyards, but under the storage
custody and control of the NSC Oakland. (Until the NSC Oakland Uniform
Automatic Data Processing System has off-station processing capability,
interim stock control and accounting procedures will have to be
established or the shipyards will have to continue performing these
functions for the material. Upon receipt of the results of a Federal
Stock Number match, by cognizance symbol, the Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts will recommend a course of action.)
7. Bureaus andlnventory Control Points willXscreen and furnish
disposition instructions for excess material located at the s
8. Procedures are to be developed to minimize double-handling of
material with a principal shipyard use application, that is, direct
delivery to the NSC Oakland shipyard storage locations, or NIF shop
stores, of steel plate, sand, special cable, etc.
9. NSC Oakland operated SERVMARTS will be established at each
shipyard to support local fleet and industrial repetitive requirements.
10. Responsive delivery and status information procedures are to be
assured.
11. Consideration will be given to "double-hatting" the shiryard
supply officers as NSC, Oakland representatives at each shipyard.
Further prognostication is dependent on how much of the aforemention-
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ed general concept cones into being. The general relationship of the
new concept to the initial proposals for BASS made by. the Bureaus in
Appendix A, reveals their dogged determination to persevere, no matter
how long it took. J36
j
There is no doubt at all about personnel savings. Some figures
being quoted at the moment are in the area of 300 to h00 persons (2 to
2.7 million dollars.)
Close control of the NIF Shop Stores operations will have to be
maintained to prevent them from becoming as big an operation as the
Supply Departments were before the consolidation.
It is believed that ultimately, the entire supply support respons-
ibilities of the new shipyard complex of the San Francisco Bay Area will
be upon the Commanding Officer of the Naval Supply Center, Oakland.
This is already the case in the Charleston and Long Beach areas. Whether
distance, requisition passing, delivery and other possible difficulties
will preclude this occurrence is only for time to reveal.
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The initial proposal by the Bureau of Ships and the Bureau of Supplies
and Accounts for an optimum supply support pattern for the San Francisco
Bay Area.
1. It is requested that the Commander, Mare Island Naval Shipyard, the
Commander, San Francisco Naval Shipyard, and the Commanding Officer, Naval
Supply Center, Oakland, jointly develop a plan for realignment of supply
support patterns in the San Francisco Bay Area to provide for the folio-wing
support concept which is designed to reduce over-all complex inventories
and improve storage space utilization while assuring continued responsive
support of operational requirements:
a. The Supply Department of each Shipyard will be concerned
principally with providing supply support for the industrial effort of the
shipyard, including the following functions:
(1) Inventory control of NIF Shop Stores,
(2) Procurement, receipt, custody and issue of NIF Shop Store
stocks and materials for direct production use.
(3) Liaison with the Naval Supply Center to assure responsive^
ness of off-station supply support to Shipyard requirements.
b. The Supply Department of e ach Shipyard will continue to carry
primary supply .system, stocks of selected items which are used predominantly
in industrial-type operations, including;
(1) Items of major equipment which a re to be installed, repaired,
overhauled, renovated, specially preserved, kept under technical surveillance
or otherwise subjected to industrial-type processes by the Shipyard, (i.e.,
selected items of cognizance symbols "F", "S", "P", and "J").
(2) Selected items, or groups of items, of general stores material
(cognizance symbol "G") which are used predominantly in industrial operation
(i.e., basic metals, boiler tubes, cable and like items intended for
production use).
(3) Items other than those included in subparagraphs l.b(l) and
(2) which, because of their physical characteristics of the location of
the predominant consumer, would -'tie most advantageously carried by the
shipyard.
c. The existing pattern for providing supply support to active ships
in the area in items of subsistence, clothing, fuel and lubricants vail
not be disturbed by this r ealignment of supply support responsibilities.
d. Supply system stocks of all other categories of material will
not be carried by the Shipyard. The Naval Supply Center, Oakland, within
the scope of its existing responsibilities as a primary stock point and
distribution point, will assume responsibility for full supply support
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of the shipyards and their dependents for items not stocked at the
Shipyards. Shipyard requirements for items in material categories not
carried by the Center will be processed by the Shipyard Supply Department
direct to the appropriate source of supply in accordance with established
supply support channels.
2. The jointly developed plan is to be forwarded for approval to BUSHIPS
(Code 730) and BUSA1JDA (Code 0L), via the Commandant, Twelfth Naval
District, at an early date which is mutually agreeable to the addressees.
For planning purposes 1 September 1958 is established as a target date for
completion of the plan.
3. With the concurrence of the Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, the
Commanding Officer, Naval Supply Center, Oakland, is requested to coordinate
local efforts as necessary in development of this plan.




This appendix contains a verbatim copy of the plan profferred by the
San Francisco Bay Area Supply activities in response to the information
requested in Appendix A.
A PLAN
For The Realignment Of
SUPPLY SUPPORT PATTERNS
In The
SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA
I. ULTIMATE SUPPORT PATTERN
Ao Assignment of Responsibility Tor Support of Bay Area Dependents .
Naval Supply Center, Oakl ind 111 assume complete material support
re i on!
'r LIU i >r 1 v ss 1: ' San Francisco Bay Area and those
sarfenlijrtes presently supported^ v. S ipyards Mare Island and San
Lcisco, exce ; :
1. Non-replenishable Emergency issues may be made by Naval
Shipyards Marc Island and San Francisco to ships during availabilities.
2. Issues of carried items (see paragraph I-B below) may bo made
to local shore activities on a rcplenishable basis.
B. Echelons of Supply .
1. Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San Francisco will be primary
>ck points for Cognizance Symbols "F", "J", and "S" material, and material
of the following classes in cognizance codes as indicated:
Class Cognizance Class Cognizance
2010 G II 58-A11 H
20li0 G K 5815 ]
2910 G H 5990 H
29UO G H 6105 II
3h32 G H 61U0 H
3510 G H 61U5 G II
3950 G II 6320 H
Ill-All H 66o5 II
U3-A11 G II 6730 H
UUio TJ 6830 G
UU5o H 7310 G H




I6h0 H 012O G
U620 II 9S-A11 G
U7-A11 G II 96-All G
U8-A11 G II All Fraction Code X as appropriate
Note (1) Naval Shipyard San Francisco Only
The foregoing classes include industrial use material and fomer "S"
Cognizance items transferred to "H" and "G" Cognizance. Repair parts in
these classes may be reduced in depth and breadth in accordance with
criteria hereinafter defined.
2. Cognizance Symbol X material and stock Automotive Equipment
(except passenger carrying), Materials Handling and Mobile Weight Handling
Equipment (Bureau of Ships) will be transferred to Naval Supply Center,
Oakland or as otherwise directed by the Inventory Manager.
Note (2) Transfer of Cognizance Symbol X material from Naval Shipyard
Mare Island to Naval Supply Center, Oakland has been approved
by Commander, Military Sea Transport Service Letter Serial
883 IfU S2 (C-U621) dated 1 August 1953.
Note (3) Bureau of Ships Instruction 9031. 1A assigned Naval Shipyard
San Francisco as an issue point for Automotive Equipment
(except passenger carrying), Materials Handling and Mobile
Weight Handling Equipment of the Bureau of Ships.
3. Naval Supply Center, Oakland will become the West Coast Dis-
tribution Point for Cognizance Symbol "P" material. This designation
cannot be made until stocks have been transferred from Naval Shipyard Mare
Island to Naval Supply Center, Oakland. As this question involves the
Bureau of Ships, Submarine Supply Office, Naval Supply Center, Oakland
and Naval Shipyard Mare Island, ultimate disposition shoujBl be handled as
a separate matter. Naval Supply Center, Oakland will initiate appropriate
action in this regard.
'i-^ 1
U. Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San Francisco will confine
stocks of non-industrial "H" , "N", "G", and "Z" material (except ZX
fraction) to items having repetitive issues, with depth reduced to 90 days'
operating level, plus safety factor and procurement lead time as provided
for secondary stock points in Volume II, BuSandA Manual, and as may be
modified by local experience.
Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San Francisco will make periodic
stock reviews to meet above objectives.
For this purpose, a repetitive issue is defined as that frequency
of demand which w arrant s the establishment of a new item in stock in
accordance with criteria prescribed by inventory managers in Volume II,
BuSandA Manual. In the case of Cognizance "N» material, the criteria for
Cognizance "G" will apply.
5. Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San Francisco will procure
Cognizance Symbol "GA" material items when it is more practical to do so
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than procure from Naval Supply Center, Oakland due to the nature of the
item and sources of supply involved.
C. Supply Operations .
1. Planned Requirements .
a. Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San Francisco will retain
basic responsibility for insuring the a vailability of planned requirements
of the Shipyards.
b. Items Available at Naval Supply Center, Oakland . For
those cognizance symbol material items for which Naval Shipyards Mare
Island and San Francisco will no longer be Primary Stock Points, Naval
Supply Center, Oakland will provide information as to the availability of
stocks at Naval Supply Center, Oakland. Items may be reserved in Naval
Supply Center, Oakland stocks upon request of the Shipyards.
c
.
Items Not Available at Naval Supply Center, Oakland
. If
non-availability at Naval Supply Center, Oakland is indicated, the planned
requirements will be forwarded to Naval Supply Center, Oakland for procure-
ment and r eservation if requested.
2. Purchase Authority. Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San
Francisco will retain current purchase authorit;/.
II. PHASED IMPLEMENTATION. (See Note (U))
A. Immediate
1. Bureau of Supplies and Accounts/Bureau of Ships .
Initiate action to transfer Cognizance Symbol X items and
Automotive equipment (except passenger carr3ang), Materials Handling and
Mobile Weight Handling Equipment from Naval Shipyard San Francisco to
Naval Supply Center, Oakland or as otherwise directed by the Inventory
Manager.
2. Supply Demand Control Point Action .
a. Expedite disposal and. redistribution action on excesses
held at Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San Francisco.
b. Discontinue passing requisitions in retail quantities to
Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San Francisco if available elsewhere,
minimizing retail redistribution and emphasizing wholesale redistribution
of excess stock.
Note (It) Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San Francisco, as authorized
by the Ordnance Supply Office, have completed transfer of in-
active Z Cognizance material to Naval Supply Center, Oakland,




3. Naval Supply Center, Oakland .
a. Assume responsibility for stock material support of all
currently assigned satellites and fleet units berthed at Naval Shipyards
Mare Island and San Francisco.
b. Accept material turned in by ships at Naval Shipyards
Mare Island and San Francisco, except for Cognizance Symbols "S", "F"
,
"J", and "P".
c. Assume responsibility as Outfit Supply Activity (Supply
Officer furnished material) in support of new construction and conversion
programs at Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San Francisco.
d. Consider all demands of Naval Shipyards Mare Island and
San Francisco in affected cognizances as replenishable.
B. Future
1. Supply Demand Control Point Action .
a. Designate Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San Francisco
as secondary stock points by cognizance code on the beginning dates of
stock purification and transfer in accordance with the implementation
schedule. See paragraph C-l below.
b. On designating Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San
Francisco as secondary stock points, divert or direct shipments resulting
from central procurement and redistribution to Naval Supply Center, Oakland,
vice the Naval Shipyards, except for definite planned projects and interim
replenishments.
2. Naval Supply Center, Oakland . On designation of Shipyards
Mare Island and San Franciscc as secondary stock points by cognizance code:
a. Provide availability information to Naval Shipyards Mare
Island and San Francisco on cognizance codes in secondary status.
b. Procure "Not in Stock" or "Hot Carried" items to support
planned requirements of Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San Francisco.
c. Naval Supply Center, Oakland will make comparison of
Naval Shipyards excesses with Naval Supply Center, Oakland current stock
activity and forward results to Supply Demand Control Point involved,
requesting disposition instructions on stocks excess to Naval Supply
Center, Oakland requirements.
3. Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San Francisco .
a. Determine the range and depth of stock of items with
repetitive usage to support their respective efforts, based on prescribed
criteria for operating levels of supply. All excess items and quantities




b. Subsequent to receipt of disposition action from Supply
Demand Control Points, Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San Francisco and
Naval Surply Center, Oakland will arrange a mutually agreeable schedule
for the movement of stocks to be transferred to Naval Supply Center,
Oakland.
C. Schedule
1. It is planned to accomplish the above purification and








Non-Industrial G 12 Months
2. Cognizance "F", "J", and "S" . Bureau of Ships and Bureau
of Ordnance review stocks of r eady-for-issue items in store at Naval
Shipyards Mare Island and San Francisco, and for items which are not
specifically committed, to definite installations and do not require
technical surveillance, initiate action to transfer to Naval Supply
Center, Oakland, obtaining additional storage allocation from the




On 7 November 1958 the Bureau of Ships and the Bureau of Supplies
and Accounts reconstituted and promulgated a new overall plan for the
consolidation of supply functions in the San Francisco Bay Area.
OUTLINE PLAN FOR CONSOLIDATION OF SUPPLY
IIYKMTORIES AND RELATED SUPPLY FUNCTIONS IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY ARnA
I. ULTIMATE SUPPLY SUPPORT CONCEPT
1. Supply Departments, Fare Island and San Francisco NAVSFIPYD's are to:
a. Be discontinued as supply distribution activities, carry no supply
inventories, except NIF inventories, and perform no supply system functions.
b. te reduced and appropriately reorganized to perform the following
principle functions:
(1) Administration of NIF Shop Stores and Direct Material
Inventory.
(2) Purchase of industrial materials not obtainable from supply
system stocks, within present purchase authority; and, in accordance with
local arrangements, procure items not-in-stock at NSC Oakland to satisfy
emergency situations at the Shipyards (Item III - 1 and 2).
(3) Liaison with NSC Oakland to assure continuity of support of
Shipyard material requirements.
2. NSC Oakland is to:
a. Carry consolidated supply inventories necessary to support the
yards, vessels in the Shipyards, and shore activities presently
ndent on the Shipyards for supply support.
b. Provide complete and responsive supply support for the Shipyards
and present Shipyard dependents, utilizing the optimum combination of the
several approved procedural arrangements, including:
(1) Ready supply stores
(2) Auxiliary stores
(3) Direct deliver;/ from regular Center stocks, wj ich may be
prepositioned either at the Center site or on the Shipyard premises.
c Establish an appropriately staffed organizational component on
the premises of each Shipyard to administer NSC Oakland support
responsibilities at the Shipyard site. This component is to be headed by
a Supply Corps Officer of adequate rank nd experience to assure complete
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responsiveness of assigned functions to Shipyard requirements. This
Officer will report for additional duty to the appropriate Shipyard
Commander. The principal functions of this component are to include the
following:
(1) Liaison with the Shipyard Supply Officer
(2) Administration of NSC Oakland supply support operations on
the Shipyard premises (item 1-2 above.)
(3) Receipt of material turned in by vessels in the Shipyard.
(It) Other coordination functions assigned by the Commanding
Officer, NSC Oakland.
II. BASIC OBJECTIVES
To achieve the optimum balances among the follovdng objectives, consistent
with economy and continued resronsiveness to total service requirements:
1. Maximum, economy of overall supply support operations.
2. Minimum complex inventory levels.
3. Minimum relocation of stocks and initial adjustment costs.
h. Minimi i [plication of supply organizations, facilities and
functions.
5. Timely satisfaction of Shipyard, material requirements.
6. Maximum refinement of Shipyard Supply Department efforts
to permit concentration on industrial supply support.
7. Maximum consolidation of supply system distributive responsibilities
in NSC Oakland.
III. SHIPYARD SUPPLY SUPPORT
1. NIF Inventories . The first echelon of supply support for Shipyard
material requirements will continue to be NIF Shop Stores and Direct
Material Inventory. No basic change is contemplated in NIF inventory
and. related supply functions. NIF Shop Stores are to be replenished from
NSC Oakland supply system stocks, or, if a commercial item, from purchase.
Local arrangements may be made Thereby items not-in-stock at NSC Oakland,
but necessary to satisfy an emergency situation at the Shipyard, may be
obtained from other sources by the Shipyard for direct delivery. NSC
Oakland must be so advised to assure proper treatment of historical
demand data.
2. Purchase. Shipyards are to retain current purchase authority and
perform ov.-n industrial purchasing to.thin the scope of that authority.
Purchase requirements beyond Shipyard authority are to be referred to




. A United (90-day) stock of selected, fast-moving
items may be established in a single location at each Shipyard to supplement
(but not duplicate) NIF Shop Stores and to make direct issues of items not
carried in the NIF Shop Stores. These stocks will be under the custody
and inventory control of NSC Oakland. The Center is to develop, in
conjunction with the Shipyards, the optimum combination of procedural
mechanisms (i.e., ready supply stores, auxiliary stores with postposting
procedures, etc.) to permit proper inventory control over these stocks,
consistent w ith the needs of, each Shipyard. Such procedures are to be
appropriately tailored to satisfy local requirements while maintaining
consistency with other objectives (item II above). (MOTE: The "Rapid-
Issue" concept now employed by the San Francisco NAV5IIPYD, whereby
limited stocks of some 70,000 items provide Q0% of all industrial issues,
may serve as a pattern for these supplemental stocks").
H. Operating Principles
. The following principles are to be incorporated
in the procedures of the consolidated NSC Oakland supply operation to
assure responsive support of Shipyard material requirements:
a. NSC Oakland is to issue, obligate or procure items, a ropriate,
based on Shipyard requirement documents (stub requisitions, advance material
requirements lists, etc.).
b. NSC Oakland is to record issues to Shipyards as replenishable
demand.
c. Shipyard planned requirements are tobe treated as follows:
(1) Shipyards retain basic responsibility to initiate
appropriately timed requests to assure availability of planned requirements.
(2) Items available at NSC Oakland are to be reserved in stock
as requested by the Shipyards.
(3) Items not available at NSC Oakland arc tobe procured by
NSC Oakland and reserved in stock as requested by the Shipyards.
(h) NSC Oakland and the Shipyards are to maintain a continuing
closely-coordinated review of outstanding planned requirements and institute
positive procedures to assure prompt cancellation of items no longer
required.
d. NSC Oakland is to maintain such daily delivery schedules as are
necessary to assure timely delivery of Shipyard material requirements.
e. NSC Oakland, in conjunction vritfo the Shipyards, is to develop
transceiver or other approprial : id-communication systems between the
Center and the Shipyards to facilitate prompt transmission of necessary
supply support information.
f. NSC Oakland is to annotate copies of Shipyard requirements




g. NSC Oakland is to establish additional liaison contacts within the
Center, as appropriate, to facilitate the interchange of information
relative to Shipyard material requirements.
IV. DISPOSITION OF SHIPYARD SUPPLY STOCKS
1. General
, All Shipyards' supply stocks, except NIF inventories, are to
be transferred to the custody of NSC Oakland; however, relocation of stocks
to the Center site need not precede the effective date of consolidation.
As a goal, relocation is to be accomplished by attrition to the maximum
practicable extent. (NOTE: Priority attention is to be given, however,
to relocation of stocks of the San Francisco NAVSHIPYD to permit evacuation
of leased space and to generate necessary additional space for interim
storage of industrial items).
2. Excesses
. BUSANDA will arrange for the -several inventory managers to
critically review the composite Shipyard-Center inventories, reduce stocks
to meet requirements of the consolidated supply operation, and issue
disposition instructions for items in excess of area and system
requirements.
3. Ultimate Stock Locations . As a matter of policy, only the following
categories of material are to be pre-positioned as supply stocks on the
Shipyard premises under custody and control of NSC Oakland*
a. Items specified by NSC Oakland which are used predominantly in
the Shipyards' industrial effort (i.e., selected items of cognizance
s mfools 5,J,F and "yard classes" of G, H and N), including items in
a not-ready-for-issue condition requiring repair or overhaul by
Shipyards' industrial organizations.
b. Items of equipment definitely committed to Shipyards' installation
projects or similar active prograns.
c. Limited quantities of selected fast-moving stocks for supplement
NIF Shop Stores (item III-3 above). (NOTE: To avoid mass relocation of
fast-moving stocks, the prescribed stock level of 90 days is to be reached
by attrition wherever possible).
All other supply stocks are to be pre-positioned ultimately in NSC Oakland
facilities rather than in the Shipyards.
V. TRANSFER OF SHIPYARD INVENTORY CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES
1. NSC Oakland is to develop, in conjunction with the Shipyards, a time-
phased plan to transfer to the Center responsibility for inventory control
of Shipyard supply stocks, except NIF inventories.
2. The consolidation of inventory control responsibilities in NSC Oakland




3. NSC Oakland is to develop, in conjunction with the Shipyards, the
optimum combination of procedural mechanisms (as indicated in Item III-3
above) to exercise inventory control over stocks positioned on Shipyard
premises, appropriately tailored to satisfy local needs and in consonance
with other objectives. NSC Oakland is to determine the adaptability of
post-posting procedures for issues of regular stock items pre-positioned
on Shipyard premises.
U. NSC Oakland is to ..assure that plans and schedules relative to this
transfer are carefully coordinated with inventory managers to permit
appropriately timed action by the inventory manager concerned to:
a. Divert inbound Shipyard replenishments to NSC Oakland.
b. In system redistribution operations, discontinue referring
retail items to the Shipyards for issue when the items are available
elsewhere, to permit concentration on the consolidation process.
£. On approval to implement the consolidation, NSC Oakland will commence
immediately to fill Shipyard interim requirements from local stocks.
VI. TRANSFER OF HON - INDUSTRIAL ACCOUNTING FUNCTIONS
All non-NIF accounting functions presently performed by the Shipyards,
other than those directly related to their own industrial operations, are
to be transferred to NSC Oakland. Material issues to the Shipyards are
to be billed by the Center as direct charges to NIF. No stores accounting
is to be performed by the Shipyards since no supply stocks are to be
carried.
VII. OUTFIT SUPPLY ACTIVITY OPERATIONS
Shipyards are to continue to be designated as Outfit Supply Activity for
their respective construction and conversion programs; however, the source
of "Supply Officer Furnished material" is to be shifted to NSC Oakland.
Local procedures should provide for the following*
1. Shipyards are to furnish lists of Supply Officer Furnished
material to NSC Oakland indicating delivery instructions.
2. NSC Oakland is to issue and deliver items of "Supply Officer
Furnished material" to the designated assembly area in the Shipyard.
3. Shipyards are to accept supply items from NSC Oakland at the
designated assembly area and perform remaining functions of the Outfit
Supply Activity.
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL PROVISIONS
1. Repair of Industrial-T/Te Item s. Industrial items in a non-RFI
condition are to be forwarded for repair by NSC Oakland directly to Shipyard
shops on a custody basis, not transferred between Supply Officers.
2. Special Supply Projects . Special supply projects presently assigned.
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the Shipyard Supply Departments, such as the Supply Availability Program,
are to be reassigned to NSC Oakland where practicable.
3. Material Turned-in to Store . Material turned-in by vessels in the
Shipyards is to be accepted for processing by the NSC Oakland "liaison
group" at the Shipyard, not the Shipyard Supply Department.
IX. WAREHOUSES AND RELATED EQUIPMENT
Generally, warehouses, open storage areas and related equipment are to
remain with the Shipyards. However, the Shipyards are to provide ware-
house facilities required by the Center to accommodate materials to be
prepositioned on the Shipyard premises and support operations to be
performed at the Shipyard site by NSC Oakland. As an objective, the
Center is to perform as much of the consolidated supply task as possible
with present equipment. Justified additional equipment may be acquired
by transfer from BUSKIPS on a permanent ownership basis to the extent
permitted by residual Shipyard equipment requirements.
X. ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING
Adjustments must be made in the procedures, organization, staffing and
funding structures of the Shipyard Supply Departments and the Center to
accommodate this realignment of supply and fiscal support functions.
Generally, each shipyard supply department is to consist of the Supply
Officer and assistants necessary for planning, administration and
performance of only the following residual functions:
Supply Control, including ;
Liaison and coordination with NSC Oakland and Shipyard Departments
with respect to supply support of Shipyard requirements.
Purchasing, receipt control and material inspection
Material handling functions related to NIF Shop Stores and Direct
] .erial Inventory operations, including :
Receiving and delivery
Physical handling of items for disposal
Shop Stores operations, including :
Control - stock records, replenishment, related functions
Inventory
Warehousing






Residual Supply Department functions in Outfit Supply Activity operations
(Item VII above)
Personnel of the Shipyard Supply Departments affected by this action are
entitled to exercise their rights under the transfer of functions




Following the BuShips, BuSandA, NSC Oakland, and shipyard's confer-
ence at Oakland on 17-10 November 1958, the area to be studied, as
provided in Appendix C was reiterated as Enclosure (1) to the following
basic letter promulgated by the two bureaus on U; January 1959.
JOINT LETTER
From: Chief, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts
Chief, Bureau of Ships
To: Commander, Mare Island Naval Shipyard
Commander, San Francisco Naval Shipyard
Commanding Officer, Naval Supply Center, Oakland
Via: Commandant, Twelfth Naval District
Subj: Supply Support Pattern in the San Francisco Bay Area
Ref: (a) BUSHIPS-BUSANDA ltr L0-6(73O) Ser 730-13, L3/53U2
A23/NY9 of lh Mar 1958
(b) NSC Oakland ltr Code 25 of 10 Sep 1958 with COMTWELVE 1st End
(c) BUSHIPS-BUSANDA ltr ND/l2/A3(730) Ser 730-3U, L3/5718
A23/NY9 of 7 Nov 1958
(d) BUSHIPS-BUSANDA-Maro Island NAVSHIPYD-San Francisco MAVSI1PYD-
NSC Oakland Conference at Oakland 17-18 Nov 1958
End: (1) Outline Plan for Consolidation of Supply Inventories and
Related Supply Functions in the San Francisco Bay Area
1. References (a) and (b) represent the results of preliminary planning
for the realignment of supply support patterns in the San Francisco Bay
Area industrial-supply complex. In accordance with guidelines furnished
the Bureau of Ships and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, this
I
Lanning was designed to continue the Mare Island and San Francisco Naval
Shipyards as supply distribution activities, but to limit Shipyards'
material inventories to items used predominantly for industrial purposes
(i.e., cognizance symbols S, F, J and "yard classes" of G, H, and N. It
was anticipated that the Naval Supply Center, Oakland would provide full
supply support to the Shipyards in items not stocked by their respective
Supply Departments. Reference (c) approved for immediate implementation
the preliminary actions proposed in subparagraphs 6a, b and c of reference
(b) and indicated that the overall consolidation concept was being examined
by BUSHIPS and BUSANDA to determine the practicability of a more complete
integration of supply inventories and non-industrial supply functions than
was originally contemplated.
2. The continuance of more than one major supply distribution activity in
the Navy industrial-supply complexes has been cited as unnecessary and. un-
economical duplication by various inspection and audit teams, including
those of the General Accounting Office, the Naval Inspector General and the
Comptroller of the Navy. Consolidation of inventories and supply functions
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in these complexes has been strongly recommended by these agencies. In
this connection funds for service-wide supply operations in°Fiscal Year
I960 have been curtailed at the budget review level based upon estimates
of savings which can be realized by such consolidations. Since the locally
developed plan, reference (b), did not envision a substantial consolidation
of supply functions and since the plan did not include an estimate of the
savings potential, the Bureaus are not presently in a position to either
concur with or disagree with the anount of the savings estimated during
budget review. The Bureaus do agree, however, that the potential for
savings of both men and material is of sufficient significance to warrant
a more comprehensive local analysis to develop optimum supply support
arrangements for this industrial-supply complex.
3. Enclosure (1) details some concepts which have been developed by the
Bureaus, discussed during reference (d), and which should be the subject
of a detailed feasibility study, including evaluation in terms of savings,
responsiveness, and elimination of duplication in supply functions in the
Bay Area. Basically, the proposal detailed in enclosure (1) is the Bureaus 1
detailed summary of the thoughts expressed during the conference, reference
(d). It provides for maximum consolidation of supply system functions into
NSC Oakland. This concept provides for retaining a supply liaison and
purchase group within the Shipyards.
lu Several other patterns of supply support exist. The following concepts,
completely undetailed, are also considered to merit considerable study and
cost evaluation since the?/ may permit, in a practicable way, realization
of the objectives of a reduction of at least 2^0 man years of effort
(approximately $1.2 millions savings to the appropriation Servicer;! de
Supply and Finance), reduced inventory levels in the area, and assurance
of fully responsive supply support:
a. Realign supply support responsibilities as proposed in reference (b).
b. Continue Shipyards as supply distribution activities, but dis-
continue Shipyards' supply inventories which duplicate items in MIF Shop
Stores, where necessary, and replenish them direct from NSC Oakland.
c. Discontinue Shipyard supply departments and reassign the residual
industrial supply functions (items I-l-b of enclosure (1)) to a Material
Division of the Shipyard Planning or Production Department.
d. Realign primary and secondary supply support responsibilities in
such a manner as to eliminate the duplication of any cognizance symbol, or
clasres when appropriate, between the Shipyards and NSC Oakland, similar
to the Pearl Harbor consolidation.
£. In studying the several possible supply support patterns, it is 'requested
that a realistic evaluation of additional planning and scheduling costs,
transportation costs and follow-up costs at the Center and. the Shipyards be
included as well as the following:
a. Proposed adjustment of existing organization structures, staffing
and funding requirements.




c. Residual problem areas requiring resolution at the Navy Depart-
ment level, together with recommended, solutions.
6. In each case the study of the support patterns listed above, and any
additional ones developed locally, should be progressed to the point where
feasibility can be clearly established. Those patterns which prove to be
feasible should be made the subject of a detailed plan including the
elements in paragraphs h and 5 above and submitted to the Bureaus with
appropriate recommendations. Such a study is specifically requested for
the concept outlined in enclosure (1). Because of other improvement
actions in process, such as inventory management with computers, care
must be exercised in segregating any related savin s from those resulting
from consolidation plans. In view of the fact tl. the fiscal year I960
bufiget has been reduced, by $1.2 millions based on an as; 1 potential
savings to SWS&FN of 2^0 man years through action in the San Francisco
Bay area, it is urgent that studies be completed as soon as possible.
It is desired that a target date of 1 March 1959 be established for
submittal of the preliminary plans. Phased implementation should
contemplated with the intent that action will be well underway by 1 July
1959. BUSANDA and BUSFIPS will provide guidelines and assistance in
specific problem, areas as requested, including a visit of bureau
representatives during February 1959 to discuss locally developed plans
prior to submission.
7. As proposed in reference (b), and to facilitate implementation of
consolidation plans, BUSANDA is requesting the several inventory
managers to critically review the supply inventories of the two Shipyards,
to identify system excesses to Shipyard stocks wherever possible, and
to dispose of such excesses fron Shipyard stocks.
8. With the concurrence of the Commandant, TWELFTH Naval District,
the Commanding Officer, NSC Oakland, is requested to coordinate local




On 2h April 19^9, the Bay Area activities involved submitted a
collection of various forms of attack on the Bay Area Supply Support
Pattern consolidation. Plan VI, developed by the Naval Shipyard, San
Francisco, is provided in this appendix.
PLAN VI
I. ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPPORT OF BAY AREA DEPENDENTS
In accordance -with 12ND Notice UhOl of 29 December 1958, Naval Supply
Center, Oakland assumed complete material support responsibility for all
vessels in the San Francisco Bay Area and those satellites formerly
supported by Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San Francisco, except non-
replenishable emergency issues may be made by Naval Shipyards Mare Island
and San Francisco to ships and local activities.
II. ECHELONS OF SUPPLY
A. Line items carried at NSY will be reduced to an estimated 25,000.
With the exception of approximately 600 selected items, Shipyards will
become a non-reporting secondary stocking point. The 600 carried items
mil be held in a reporting secondary status.
B. The Supply Department will carry back-up stocks of Shop Stores
items to a limited degree only. It is anticipated that this will cover
a 5 to 10 percent range of Shop Stores items, selected on the basis of
the rate of issue and the Shop Store physical limitations restricting
full sixty to ninety days stock requirements from being carried. Items
falling in this category are welding electrodes, pi^e, tubing, cable,
and steel. In addition, some items which have a continuing Shop Store
requirement and also frequent requirements through rapid-issue procedures
for direct use Yd.ll be retained. All of the above are intended to hold
duplication of stock between Shop Stores and the main inventory to a
minimal degree consistent with the industrial support required.
C. The responsibilitv for "F" , "J" and "S" cogs will be transferred
to Naval Supply Center, Oakland; however, relocation of stocks would take
place over a period of two years or even more in orderate- reduce local
inventories by attrition with resultant decrease in transportation and
handling costs. Until stocks are actually moved to Naval Supply Center,
Oakland, the Supply Department would store the material and would make
issues as requested by Naval Supply Center, Oakland. The above will also
be applicable to "P" cog equipments positioned at the shipyard.
D. All materials and equipments procured from other Supply Officers
for direct issue to a program or project will be billed directly to the
Navy Industrial Fund (Form 1080 procedure vs. 0S0 procedure) rather than
transferred to the Supply Officer. This will reduce the stores accounting







. Naval Shipyard will retain basic




Items Available at Naval Supply Center, Oakland . Naval
Supply Center, Oakland will provide information as to the availability
of stocks at Naval Supply Center, Oakland. Items may be reserved in
Naval Supply Center, Oakland stocks upon request of the Shipyard.
3. Items Not Available at Naval Supply Center, Oakland . If
non-availability at Naval Supply Center, Oakland is indicated, the planned
requirements will be forwarded to Naval Supply Center, Oakland for
procurement and reservation if requested.
B. Issues Direct to NIF . All issues by Naval Supply Center,
Oakland to Shipyard end-use will be billed direct to NIF.
C. Purchase Authority . Naval Shipyard will retain current
purchase authority.
D. Preservation. Supply Departments will perform minimal
preservation.
SAN FRANCISCO NAVAL SHIPYARD CQW1ENTS
A. Since BuShips/BuSandA Joint Ltr of lU January 19£9 indicated
that Plan II was considered by the Bureaus not to provide the desired
degree of integration of supply inventories and functions, the San
Francisco Naval Shipyard developed a Plan VI with the intent of maximizing
that integration while at the same time minimizing the adverse effects
on supply support responsiveness.
B. San Francisco Naval Shipyard considers that Plan VI:
1. Concentrates Shipyard Supply Department effort on industrial
support.
2. Consolidates supply distribution functions.
3. Minimizes duplication of supply organization, facilities,
and functions.
k» Minimizes duplication of stocks in the Bay Area, including
within the Shipyard.
$, Achieves a 7% reduction in Shipyard main inventory stocks.
6. Removes only a minimal amount of material from the reporting
system consistent with the savings to be obtained.
C. However, it is recognized that implementation of this plan might
be too rapid a change in the Bay Area supply support system, thus
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increasing the risk of adversely affecting the productive effort
substantially out of proportion to the increased savings to be achieved.
MARE ISLAND NAVAL SHIPYARD CONVENTS
A. This Plan is an extension and expansion of Plan II in three
basic respects :
1. Further item reduction.
2. Substantial reduction in Cogs F, J, S, and P (Equipments)
material through disposal and transfer action.
3. Transfer of control functions for Cogs F, J, S, and P
(Equipments) remaining at the Shipyard to NSC, Oakland.
B. Comment on each point follovre :
1. The possibility of further item reduction of stock is
recognized. However, this must be done on the basis of refined and
detailed analysis of usage and storage factors. Mare Island stock records
were converted to EDP in February 195>9« It is considered that the accumula-
tion of industrial-support-usage information for a period of one year
will permit such a refined and detailed analysis. The stock levels thus
attained should not be less under similar workload than that ultimately
achieved tinder Plan II.
2. The stocking of Cogs F, J, S, and P (Equipments) at the
Shipyard, unless intended for a specifically planned shipboard installation,
is not required. However, the one-tine costs of moving the substantial
stocks from Mare Island are considered prohibitive. Furthermore, much
of this material is not ready for issue and would require movement back
to the Shipyard for repair and overhaul prior to issue.
3. Since Plan VI envisions the retention of the control
function at the Shipyard for other stocks, no advantage is seen in
transferring the control function for Cogs F, J, S, and P (Equipment)
to NSC, Oakland. The cost of performing this function (and Stores
Accounting) for the relatively few items involved is considered relatively
insignificant, and the transfer of this function would provide little,
if any, savings. It is possible that less rather than greater efficiency
would result since:
a. The receipt, maintenance-in-store, and issue of these
items is not "clean". Incomplete items, type of repairs necessary,
condition code, serial numbers, cannibalization, etc., all tend to complicate
the paperwork,
b. Much of the material moves as a result of direct
telephone conversation with the Bureau or SDCP concerned.
c. NSC, Oakland would be placed in the position of a
middleman, performing the control function, but with the material handling




To the extent that stocks of SDCP controlled material at the
Shipyards would be less under Plan VI than under Plan II, NSC, Oakland
considers Plan VI preferable to Plan II. It is to be noted, however,
that under Plan BI, considerable SDCP cog material remains outside the
reporting system and. thus unavailable for emergencies elsewhere.
Further, for these unreported materials, the Shipyards' changes in
demand rates are not reflected and reported to the SDCPs until and unless




On 2li April 1959, the Bay Area Activities involved submitted a
collection of various forms of attack on the Bay Area Supply Support
Pattern consolidation. Plan VII, developed by the Naval Supply Center,
Oakland, is provided in this appendix.
PLAN' VII
I. ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPPORT OF BAY AREA. DEPENDENTS
' i ... i .... i - -
, . . .
i, . i i f
In accordance -with 12ND Notice UUOl of 29 December 19-58, Naval
Supply Center, Oakland assumed complete material support responsibility
for all vessels in the San Francisco Bay Area and those satellites
formerly supported by Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San Francisco,
except non-replenishable emergency issues may be made by Naval Shipyards
Mare Island and San Francisco to ships and local activities.
II. ECHELONS OF SUPPLY
Non-NIF stocks physically at Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San
Francisco will be confined to those items which:
1. Have high degree of repetitive demand from the industrial
effort, e.g., welding rod.
2. The Shop Stores are unable to stock due to physical
limitations, e.g., insulation.
3. Have been positioned by the Inventory Manager for a
definite, planned shipboard installation of an assigned overhaul project.
U. Naval Supply Center, Oakland does not have storage and
handling capability, e.g., certain plates and shapes.
III. SUPPLY OPERATIONS (Non-NIF Material)
A. Stock Status Reporting and Stores Accounting .
Naval Supply Center, Oakland will perform all reporting and
accounting functions for all material positioned at the NSYs, including
providing status by site locations if required by Inventory Manager and
approved by BuSandA. Stock record maintenance, if any, at NSYs mil be
on quantity basis only.
B. Issues to Industrial Effort .
Issues of material positioned at the Shipyards to industrial
effort will be on post-posting procedures. Except for items in category
II-A (1), (2) and (H) above, the primary source of shop stores replenish-
ment will be direct from stocks at Naval Supply Center, Oakland.
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2. Carry out all functions of the "residual" Supply Departments,
including supply functions for NIF material.
Organization should be such as to minimize duplicate organiza-
tions for comparable functions as they apply to both NIF and Non-NIF
material. The Supply Officers of NSYs, and possibly other officers as
appropriate, would have additional duty to Commanding Officer, MSC, Oakland
peitaining to their responsibility for the custody of non-NIF stocks at the
Shipyards and for maintenance of proper items and stock levels. Effort
should be made to eliminate the need for any NSC, Oakland personnel
regularly stationed at the NSYs. All personnel in the Shipyard performing
supply functions would thus be Shipyard personnel.
C. Supply Departments of NSYs would be 1001 NIF financed. Any
vrork performed for supply system, e.g., HHG, packing or shipping of
non-NIF items, would be handled on a project basis and charged to SWSN.
D. In summary, NSC, Oakland considers that Plan VII:
1. Achieves all of the inventory management advantages of
Plan I.
2. Leaves the Shipyards the day-to-day authority for the
maintenance of necessary stocks to meet immediate needs; it especially
provides necessary local information.
3. Permits Shipyard Commanders complete latitude in staffing
for expediting and follow-up operations since all personnel engaged in
supply operations at the Shipyards would be under Shipyard ceilings and
funded under NIF, therefore, the Shipyard Commanders could maintain this
force at whatever level they considered necessary.
U. Very importantly, avoids duplications of functions within
the Shipyard which would occur under Plan I.
5. Limits SWSN support to supply system work actually
performed and not subject to custodial costs of stocks kept at the
Shipyards for the benefit of the industrial effort.
MARE ISLAND NAVAL SHIPYARD COMMENTS
A. This Plan is a further extension and refinement of Plan VI in
two basic aspects :
1. Transfer of all inventory control and stores accounting
to NSC, Oakland.
2. Funding by the Naval Shipyards of 100$ of the custodial
cost of non-NIF stores. Work performed for the Supply System would be
handled on a project basis charged to SWSN.
B. Comments made relative to Plan VI apply equally to Plan VII.
Comments on each point follows:
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C. Issues to Other Supply Officers .
Issues to other Supply Officers of materials stored at Shipyards
will be made on invoices prepared by Naval Supply Center, Oakland rath
custodian Shipyard making physical issue, including packing and shipping.
D. Planned Requirements .
1. Basic Responsibility. Naval Shipyards will retain basic
responsibility for insuring the availability of planned requirements of
the Shipyards.
2. Items Available at Naval Supply Center, Oakland. Naval
Supply Center, Oakland will provide information as to the availability
of stocks at Naval Supply Center, Oakland. Items may be reserved in
Naval Supply Center, Oakland stocks upon request of the Shipyards.
3. Items Not Available at Naval Supply Center, Oakland . If
non-availability at Naval Supply Center, Oakland is indicated, the planned
requirements will be forwarded to Naval Supply Center, Oakland for
procurement and reservation if requested.
E. Issues Direct to NIF .
All issues by Naval Supply Center, Oakland to Shipyard end-use
..ill be billed direct to NIF.
F. Purchase Authority .
Naval Shipyards Mare Island and San Francisco will retain
current purchase authority.
Supply Departments of NSYs will perform minimal preservation,
NSC OAKLAND COMMENTS
A. It is the opinion of NSC, Oakland that Plans II and VI place
considerable SDCP cog material outside the reporting system th&s unavail-
able for emergencies elsewhere; and has the additional disadvantage in
that Shipyards' changes in demand rates arc not reflected and reported
to the SDCPs until and unless the Shipyards replenish from NSC, Oakland
or turn in material as excess. Under Plan VII all non-NIF material at
the Shipyards would be on the books of NSC, Oakland and reported by
NSC, Oakland including stores accounting involved.
B. Supply Departments of Shipyards would be organized and staffed
to perform the following:




a. Through rendering Shipyard stocks vulnerable to Supply
> en demand, this proposal would deprive the Shipyard of the ability
to guarantee the availability of stocks when required. This would impair
the effectiveness of internal material control and the Production Planning
and Control Program.
b. Without instituting a duplication of inventory control
functions at the Shipyard, it will reduce responsiveness to rapid changes
in type of work and variation in workload which are characteristic of
Shipyard operation.
c. It would increase Shipyard overhead by the cost of work
interruptions and rescheduling resulting from material non-availability,
and by the cost of additional material liaison and expediting staff.
d. It would create the need for wholesale reservation of
material in Oakland stock to a degree unacceptable to the Shipyard.
2. Regulations governing NIF operations contain no authority
to support custodial costs (building maintenance, fire and police
protection, other costs and labor) of maintaining non-NIF stocks on the
Shipyard. Assumption of these costs would adversely affect the Shipyard
overhead expense rate. The movement of non-NIF material, and the
performance of other Supply Sj^stem work on a customer order would incur
overhead charges, increasing cost to SWSN.
SAN FRANCISCO NAVAL SHIPYARD C01WENTS
A. San Francisco Naval Shipyard considers that Plan VII is not
acceptable in that it reduces the Shipyard's control over material avail-
ability and procurement in support of the industrial effort with no
significant increase in savings to the Navy over Plan VI.
B. The statement that under Plan VII the Supply Departments of NSYs
would be 100$ NIF financed is misleading. The charges to SWSN on a
gect basis would be substantial and would be comparable to the charges
der the presently prescribed "split" basis. The possibility of charging
SWSN on a project basis is not unique to Plan VII j it can be done under
any plan and even at present. However, it should be noted that for the
reasons cited in paragraph £.b of the basic letter, a shift from the
"split" basis to the "project" basis of apportioning costs would normally
tend to increase costs to SWSN, assuming comparable equitability in the
determination of cost responsibility under the two bases.
C. San Francisco Naval Shipyard considers that the primary
disadvantage of Plan I is also inherent in Plan VII, i.e., reduction in
supply support responsiveness is inescapable whenever there is loss of
control by the Shipyard. In other aspects such as increased administrative
problems, a disadvantage of Plan I remains a disadvantage of Plan VII in
somewhat different form. It is considered that Plan VII is preferable




The joint BuShips-BuSandA letter of 2 July 1965.
Subj : Supply Support in the San Francisco Bay Area
Ref : ( a ) BUSHIPS/BUSANDA joint ltr Ser 731-lU L3/5S17 A3 of lU Jan. 1959
(b) MINSY/SFNSY/NSCO joint ltr of 2k April 1959
1. In accordance with reference (a), reference (b) reported the results
of detailed feasibility tests of plans for realignment of supply support
patterns in the San Francisco Bay Area. After a thorough study of these
plans, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts and the Bureau of Ships have
determined that the optimum support plan is one which will meet the
following criteria:
a. Provide that both shipyards have responsibility and authority
for control of material availability and procurement required in support
of their industrial effort.
b. Reduce non-industrial supply workload at the shipyards.
c. Reduce range and depth of selected stocks at the shipyards not
directly related to incustrial operations.
d. Accomplish maximum personnel savings without hampering supply
support in the Bay Area.
e. Involve a minimum of material movement.
2. A Bay Area support agreement has been jointly developed at the bureau
level and adopted by Bureau of Supplies and Accounts and Bureau of Ships.
This joint agreement is designed to meet the above criteria, without
publication of a formalized plan. This agreement will be implemented
commencing 2 July 1959 through a series of individual actions initiated
by Bureau of Supplies and Accounts in collaboration with Bureau of
Ships as follows:
a. Direct the discontinuance of routine redistribution from
shipyard stocks.
b. Prescribe a tailored support plan for each material category.
It is the intention that the shipyards will remain primary stocking points
for certain cogs and classes of material as agreed upon between the
shipyards and the supply demand control points. The shipyards will be
considered as "modified" primaries in that they will not normally be called
upon to serve as distribution points.
c. Reduce material input to the shipyards.
d. Determine and direct disposal actions.
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e. Determine and direct any required bulk redistributions.
3. This agreement rail impose certain new requirements on the Bay Area
activities, some of which are:
a. The Naval Supply Center will reserve material in stock and will
procure and reserve other material when requested by the shipyards.
The Naval Supply Center will bill Navy Industrial Fund directly
for appropriate items immediately chargeable to shipyard end use.
c. The Naval Supply Center will normally consider shipyard demands
as replenishable.
d. The Naval Supply Center will provide information to the shipyards
as to the availability of stocks at the Naval Supply Center.
e. The shipyards will follow prescribed criteria for operating
levels of supply in determining range and depth of stocks of iters with
repetitive usage.
It is recognized that specific actions have already been taken or planned
to date concerning changes in responsibility such as those enumerated
above. To the degree to which the bureaus have knowledge of these actions,
are considered compatible with the plan of action being implemented.
U. During the course of the phasing out of the supply functions in the
naval shipyards as planned, the transfer of function regulations
outlined in NCPI 170.9-U should be observed when identifiable supply
functions are transferred to other organisations or activities.
It is considered that complete implementation of this joint
BUSANDA/BUSHIPS agreement as indicated above will produce maximum
savings commensurate with supply system responsiveness to shipyard
ustrial requirements.
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